

is wide enough to hold the brick, even though it is not sturdy enough to actually support it, it is sufficient.

1:5 Therefore, even if the cross beam is made of straw or reeds, one considers it as though it were made of metal. If the cross beam is curved, so that a small brick cannot rest on it, one considers it as though it were straight; if it is round, one considers it as though it were square. The following principle was stated with regard to a round cross beam: Any beam with a circumference of three handbreadths is a handbreadth in width, i.e., in diameter.

1:6 The side posts the Sages spoke of with regard to rendering an alleyway fit for one to carry within it, their height must be at least ten handbreadths, and their width and thickness may be any amount. Rabbi Yosei says: Their width must be at least three handbreadths.

1:7 One may construct side posts from anything, even a living creature, provided that it was properly attached to the entrance of the alleyway, and Rabbi Yosei prohibits using a living creature as a side post. The mishna continues with a similar dispute: Even a living creature imparts ritual impurity if it used as the covering of a grave. But Rabbi Meir deems it pure. Likewise, one may write women's bills of divorce on anything, even a living creature. But Rabbi Yosei HaGelili invalidates a bill of divorce written on a living creature.

1:8 If a caravan camped in a valley, i.e., an open space not enclosed by walls, and the travelers enclosed their camp with partitions made of the animals' equipment, e.g., saddles and the like, one may carry inside the enclosed area, provided that the resultant partition will be a fence ten handbreadths high, and that there will not be breaches in the partition greater than the built segment. Any breach that is approximately ten cubits wide is permitted and does not invalidate the partition because it is considered like an entrance. However, if one of the breaches is greater than ten cubits, it is prohibited to carry anywhere in the enclosed area.

1:9 If a caravan is camped in a field, and the travelers seek to construct partitions to render the area fit for one to carry within it on Shabbat, one surrounds the area with three ropes, one above another, and a third one above the other two. One is permitted to carry within the circumscribed area provided that there will not be a gap of three handbreadths between one rope and the next. The measure of the ropes and their combined thickness must be greater than a handbreadth, so that the entire partition, consisting of three ropes and the empty spaces between them, will be ten handbreadths high.

1:10 Alternatively, one may surround the area with boards that stand upright, provided that there will not be a gap of three handbreadths between one board and the next. When the Sages issued this ruling, they spoke exclusively of a caravan; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda, who maintains that a partition of this kind, which consists of only horizontal or vertical elements, is permitted exclusively in exigent circumstances. Otherwise, full-fledged partitions are required. However, the Rabbis say: They spoke of a caravan in the mishna only because they spoke in the present, citing the most typical case. Those traveling in caravans were typically unable to erect full-fledged partitions, so they would surround their camps with ropes or boards. However,

the halakha in the mishna applies in all cases. The mishna cites an additional dispute: Any partition that is not constructed of both warp and woof, i.e., vertical and horizontal elements, is not a partition; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda. He holds that the vertical boards and the horizontal ropes are not considered a partition, even in the exigent circumstances of a caravan. However, the Rabbis say: One of the two elements, either vertical or horizontal, is sufficient. The Sages exempted a soldier in a military camp in four matters: One may bring wood for kindling from any place with no concern that he is stealing wood from its owners; and one is exempt from ritual washing of the hands before eating; and one is exempt from the separation of tithes from doubtfully tithed produce [demai], i.e., produce purchased from an am ha'aretz, one who is not diligent in separating tithes; and one is exempt from establishing an eiruv.

2:1 One may arrange upright boards [passin] around a well in the public domain in order to permit drawing water from the well on Shabbat. A well is usually at least four handbreadths wide and ten handbreadths deep. Therefore, it is considered a private domain, and it is prohibited to draw water from it on Shabbat, as that would constitute a violation of the prohibition to carry from a private domain into a public one. The Sages therefore instituted that a virtual partition may be built in the area surrounding the well, so that the enclosed area could be considered a private domain, thus permitting use of the well and carrying of the water within the partitioned area. In this specific instance, the Sages demonstrated special leniency and did not require a proper partition to enclose the entire area. For this purpose, it suffices if there are four double posts [deyomadin] that look like eight single posts, i.e., four corner pieces, each comprised of two posts joined together at right angles; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: There must be eight posts that look like twelve. How so? There must be four double posts, one in each corner, with four plain posts, one between each pair of double posts. The height of the double posts must be at least ten handbreadths, their width must be six handbreadths, and their thickness may be even a minimal amount. And between them, i.e., between the posts, there may be a gap the size of two teams [revakot] of three oxen each; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda disagrees and says: There may be a slightly larger gap, the size of two teams of four oxen each, and this gap is measured with the cows being tied together and not untied, and with the minimal space necessary for one team to be entering while the other one is leaving.

2:2 It is permitted to bring the posts closer to the well, provided that the enclosed area is large enough for a cow to stand with its head and the majority of its body inside the partitioned space while it drinks. It is permitted to distance the boards from the well and expand the enclosed area by any amount, i.e., as much as one wishes, provided that he increases the number of upright boards between the double posts.

2:3 Rabbi Yehuda says: The partitioned area may be expanded up to an area of two beit se'a, which is an area of five thousand square cubits. The Rabbis said to him: They only spoke of an area of two beit se'a with regard to a garden or an enclosure used for storing wood, scrap, and the like [karpef]. But

if it was a pen [dir], or a stable [sahar], or a backyard, or a courtyard in front of the house, even if it had an area of five beit kor or even ten beit kor, it is permitted. And it is permitted to distance the boards and expand the enclosed area by any amount, provided that one increases the upright boards between the double posts.

2:4 Rabbi Yehuda says: If the path of the public domain passes through the area of the upright boards surrounding a well and obstructs it, one must divert the path to the sides, so that the public will circumvent the enclosed area; otherwise, the partition is invalid and the enclosed area cannot be regarded as a private domain. And the Rabbis say: One need not divert the path of the public domain, for the partition is valid even if many people pass through it. In the case of a public cistern containing collected water, as well as a public well containing spring water, and even a private well, one may arrange upright boards around them in order to allow one to carry in the enclosed area, as delineated above. But in the case of a private cistern, there are two deficiencies: It belongs to an individual, and it does not contain spring water. Consequently, it is impossible to permit drawing from it on Shabbat by means of boards set up in the corners; rather, one must construct for it a proper partition ten handbreadths high; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava says: One may arrange upright boards only for a public well. But for the others, that is, a public cistern or a private well, one must set up a belt, i.e., a partition consisting of ropes, ten handbreadths high. Such an arrangement creates a proper partition based on the principle of lavud, namely, that solid surfaces with gaps between them smaller than three handbreadths are considered joined.

2:5 And furthermore, Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava said: With regard to a garden or a karpef, an enclosed courtyard used for storage, that is not more than seventy cubits and a remainder, a little more, as will be explained below, by seventy cubits and a remainder, and is surrounded by a wall ten handbreadths high, one may carry inside it, as it constitutes a proper private domain. This is provided that it contains a watchman's booth or a dwelling place, or it is near the town in which its owner lives, so that he uses it and it is treated like a dwelling. Rabbi Yehuda says: This is not necessary, for even if it contains only a water cistern, an elongated water ditch, or a cave, i.e., a covered pit containing water, one may carry inside it, as the water bestows upon it the status of a dwelling. Rabbi Akiva says: Even if it has none of these one may carry inside it, provided that it measures not more than seventy cubits and a remainder by seventy cubits and a remainder. Rabbi Eliezer says: If its length is greater than its breadth, even by one cubit, one may not carry inside it, even though its total area does not exceed an area of two beit se'a, because in an area that was enclosed not for the purpose of residence, carrying is only permitted if the area is perfectly square. Rabbi Yosei says: Even if its length is double its breadth, one may carry inside it, and there is no need to be particular about a square shape.

2:6 Rabbi Elai said: I heard from Rabbi Eliezer that one is permitted to carry in a garden or karpef, even if the garden is an area of a beit kor, i.e., thirty times larger than the area of a beit se'a. Incidentally, he adds: And

I also heard from him another halakha: If one of the residents of a courtyard forgot and did not join in an eiruv with the other residents when they established an eiruv, and on Shabbat he ceded ownership of his part in the courtyard to the other residents, then it is prohibited for him, the one who forgot to establish an eiruv, to bring in objects or take them out from his house to the courtyard; however, it is permitted to them, the other residents, to bring objects from their houses to that person's house via the courtyard, and vice versa. We do not say that the failure of one resident to join in the eiruv nullifies the validity of the eiruv for the entire courtyard. And I also heard from him another halakha, that one may fulfill his obligation to eat bitter herbs on Passover with arkablin, a certain bitter herb. With regard to all three rulings, I circulated among all of Rabbi Eliezer's disciples, seeking a colleague who had also heard these matters from him, but I could not find one.

3:1 One may establish a joining of houses in courtyards [eiruv hatzerot] in order to permit carrying on Shabbat in a courtyard shared by two or more houses, and one may establish a joining of Shabbat borders [eiruv tehumin] in order to extend the distance one is permitted to walk on Shabbat; and similarly, one may merge courtyards in order to permit carrying in an alleyway shared by two or more courtyards. This may be done with all kinds of food except for water and salt, as they are not considered foods and therefore may not be used for these purposes. The mishna continues with two similar principles: All types of food may be bought with second-tithe money, which must be taken to Jerusalem and used to purchase food (Deuteronomy 14:26), except for water and salt. Similarly, one who vows that nourishment is prohibited to him is permitted to eat water and salt, as they are not considered sources of nourishment. It was further stated with regard to the laws of joining courtyards that one may establish an eiruv tehumin for a nazirite with wine, even though he is prohibited to drink it, because it is permitted to others. And similarly, one may establish an eiruv tehumin for an Israelite with teruma, even though he may not eat it, because it is permitted to a priest. The food used for an eiruv tehumin must be fit for human consumption, but it is not essential that it be fit for the consumption of the one for whom it is being used. Summakhos, however, says: One may only establish an eiruv tehumin for an Israelite with unconsecrated food. It was additionally stated that one may establish an eiruv tehumin for a priest in a beit haperas, a field containing a grave that was plowed over. There is doubt as to the location of bone fragments in the entire area. A priest is prohibited to come into contact with a corpse, and therefore may not enter a beit haperas. Rabbi Yehuda says: An eiruv tehumin may be established for a priest even between the graves in a graveyard, an area which the priest may not enter by Torah law, since he can interpose between himself and the graves and go and eat the food that comprises the eiruv without contracting ritual impurity.

3:2 One may establish an eiruv with demai, produce purchased from one who may not have separated the required tithes, and similarly, one may establish an eiruv with the first tithe whose teruma has been taken in order to be given to a priest, and with the second tithe and consecrated articles that have been

redeemed; and priests may establish an eiruv with halla, the portion of dough that must be given to a priest. However, one may not establish an eiruv with tevel, produce from which the priestly dues [teruma] and other tithes have not been separated, nor with first tithe whose teruma, which must be given to a priest, has not been taken, nor with the second tithe or consecrated articles that have not been redeemed. If one sends his eiruv in the hands of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, all of whom are regarded as legally incompetent, or in the hands of one who does not accept the principle of eiruv, it is not a valid eiruv. But if one told another person to receive it from him at a specific location and set it down in that spot, it is a valid eiruv. The critical point in the establishment of an eiruv is that it must be deposited in the proper location by a competent person; but it is immaterial how the eiruv arrives there.

3:3 If one placed his eiruv in a tree above ten handbreadths from the ground, his eiruv is not a valid eiruv; if it is below ten handbreadths, his eiruv is a valid eiruv. If he placed the eiruv in a pit, even if it was a hundred cubits deep, his eiruv is a valid eiruv. If one placed his eiruv on top of a reed or on top of a pole [kundas], when the reed or pole is detached from its original place and stuck into the ground, even if it is a hundred cubits high, it is a valid eiruv, as one can remove the reed or pole from the ground and take his eiruv. If one put the eiruv in a cupboard and locked it, and the key was lost, so that he is now unable to open the cupboard and access the eiruv, it is nonetheless a valid eiruv. Rabbi Eliezer says: If he does not know that the key is in its place, it is not a valid eiruv.

3:4 If one's eiruv rolled beyond the Shabbat limit, and he no longer has access to his eiruv since he may not go beyond his limit, or if a pile of stones fell on it, or if it was burnt, or if the eiruv was teruma and it became ritually impure; if any of these occurrences took place while it was still day, prior to the onset of Shabbat, it is not a valid eiruv, since one did not have an eiruv at twilight, which is the time one's Shabbat residence is established. However, if any of these occurred after dark, when it was already Shabbat, it is a valid eiruv, as it was intact and accessible at the time one's Shabbat residence is determined. If the matter is in doubt, i.e., if he does not know when one of the aforementioned incidents occurred, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda say: This person is in the position of both a donkey driver, who must prod the animal from behind, and a camel driver, who must lead the animal from the front, i.e., he is a person who is pulled in two opposite directions. Due to the uncertainty concerning his Shabbat border, he must act stringently, as though his resting place were both in his town and at the location where he placed the eiruv. He must restrict his Shabbat movement to those areas that are within two thousand cubits of both locations. Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon disagree and say: An eiruv whose validity is in doubt is nevertheless valid. Rav Yosei said: The Sage Avtolemos testified in the name of five Elders that an eiruv whose validity is in doubt is valid.

3:5 A person may make a condition with regard to his eiruv of Shabbat borders. In other words, he need not decide in advance in which direction his eiruv should take effect. For example, he may deposit an eiruv on each of two

opposite sides of his town, and say: If gentiles come from the east, my eiruv is in the west, so that I can escape in that direction; and if they come from the west, my eiruv is in the east. If they come from here and from there, i.e., from both directions, I will go wherever I wish, and my eiruv will retroactively take effect in that direction; and if they do not come at all, neither from here nor from there, I will be like the rest of the inhabitants of my town and give up both eiruvim that I deposited, leaving me with two thousand cubits in all directions from the town. Similarly, one may say: If a Sage comes from the east and he is spending Shabbat beyond the boundaries of my town, my eiruv is in the east, so that I may go out to greet him there; and if he comes from the west, my eiruv is in the west. If one Sage comes from here, and another Sage comes from there, I will go wherever I wish; and if no Sage comes, neither from here nor from there, I will be like the rest of the inhabitants of my town. Rabbi Yehuda says: If one of the Sages coming from opposite directions was his teacher, he may go only to his teacher, as it is assumed that was his original intention. And if they were both his teachers, so that there is no reason to suppose that he preferred one over the other, he may go wherever he wishes.

3:6 Rabbi Eliezer says: With regard to a Festival adjacent to Shabbat, whether before it, on a Friday, or after it, on a Sunday, a person may establish two eiruvim of Shabbat borders [tehumim] and say as follows: My eiruv on the first day shall be to the east, and on the second day to the west.

Alternatively, one may say: On the first day it shall be to the west and on the second day to the east. Similarly, one may say: My eiruv shall apply on the first day, but on the second day I shall be like the rest of the inhabitants of my town, or: My eiruv shall apply on the second day, but on the first day I shall be like the rest of the inhabitants of my town. And the Rabbis disagree and say that such a split is impossible. Rather, he either establishes an eiruv in one direction for both days, or he establishes no eiruv at all; either he establishes an eiruv for the two days, or he establishes no eiruv at all. What does one do to establish an eiruv that will be valid for both the Festival and Shabbat? He or his agent brings the eiruv to the location that he wishes to establish as his residence on the eve of the first day, and he stays there with it until nightfall, the time when the eiruv establishes that location as his residence for the Festival, and then he takes it with him and goes away, so that it will not become lost before the following evening, in which case he would not have an eiruv for the second day. On the eve of the second day, he takes it back to the same place as the day before, and he stays there with it until nightfall, thereby establishing his residence for Shabbat, and then he may eat the eiruv and go away, if he so desires. Consequently, he benefits in that he is permitted to walk in the direction that he desires, and he benefits in that he is permitted to eat his eiruv. However, if the eiruv was eaten on the first day, his eiruv is effective for the first day, and his eiruv is not effective for the second day. Rabbi Eliezer said to them: If so, you agree with me that Shabbat and a Festival constitute two distinct sanctities, as if not, the eiruv that went into effect during the twilight period on the eve of the first day should have remained in effect for both days, even if it was eaten during the

first day. This being the case, you should also agree with me that one can make two separate eirubin for the two days in two different directions.

3:7 During the time period when the Jewish calendar was established by the court according to the testimony of witnesses who had seen the new moon, Rosh HaShana would be observed for only one day if witnesses arrived on that day, and for two days if witnesses failed to arrive and the month of Elul was declared to be an extended, thirty-day month. Rabbi Yehuda says: With regard to Rosh HaShana, if one feared that the month of Elul might be extended, and he wanted to travel in two different directions on the two days that could be Rosh HaShana, this person may establish two eirubin and say: My eiruv on the first day shall be to the east and on the second day to the west, or alternatively: On the first day it shall be to the west, and on the second day to the east. Similarly, he may say: My eiruv shall apply on the first day, but on the second day I shall be like the rest of the inhabitants of my town, or alternatively: My eiruv shall apply on the second day, but on the first day I shall be like the rest of the inhabitants of my town. And the Rabbis did not agree with him that the two days of Rosh HaShana can be divided in such a manner.

3:8 And Rabbi Yehuda said further, with regard to the two days of Rosh HaShana that one observes because he does not know which is the real day of the Festival: A person may make a condition with regard to a basket of tevel produce on the first day of the Festival and say as follows: If today is the Festival and tomorrow is an ordinary weekday I will separate the teruma and tithes tomorrow, and I have performed nothing today; if today is an ordinary weekday, I hereby separate the appropriate teruma and tithes now. He may then eat the produce on the second day of the Festival, since one of his two acts of tithing was certainly performed on an ordinary weekday. And similarly, an egg that was laid on the first day of the Festival may be eaten on the second day, since one of the days is certainly an ordinary weekday. And the Rabbis did not agree with him even with regard to these two days.

3:9 Rabbi Dosa ben Harekinas says: One who passes before the ark in the synagogue and leads the congregation in prayer on the first day of the festival of Rosh HaShana says: Strengthen us, O Lord our God, on this day of the New Moon, whether it is today or tomorrow. And similarly, on the following day he says: Whether Rosh HaShana is today or yesterday. And the Rabbis did not agree with him that one should formulate his prayer in this conditional manner.

4:1 With regard to one whom gentiles forcibly took him out beyond the Shabbat limit, or if an evil spirit took him out, i.e., he was temporarily insane, and found himself outside the Shabbat limit, he has only four cubits that he may walk from where he is standing. If the gentiles returned him, or if he came back while still under the influence of the evil spirit, it is as though he had never left his Shabbat limit, and he may move about within his original limit as before. If the gentiles brought him to a different city that was surrounded by walls, or if they put him into a pen or a stable, i.e., animal enclosures, the Sages disagree. Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya say: He may walk about the entire city, as the whole city is considered like four cubits. Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva say: He has only four cubits from where he was placed. The mishna relates: There was an incident where all of these Sages were coming

from Pelandarsin, an overseas location, and their boat set sail on the sea on Shabbat, taking them beyond their Shabbat limit. Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya walked about the entire boat, as they hold that the entire boat is considered like four cubits, while Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva did not move beyond four cubits, as they sought to be stringent with themselves.

4:2 The mishna further relates that on one occasion, they did not enter the port [name] until after nightfall on Shabbat eve. The others said to Rabban Gamliel: What is the halakha with regard to alighting from the boat at this time? In other words, were we already within the city's limit before Shabbat commenced? He said to them: You are permitted to alight, as I was watching, and I observed that we were already within the city's limit before nightfall. We acquired our resting place in the city during the twilight period. Therefore, it is permitted to walk throughout the city even after nightfall.

4:3 With regard to one who was permitted to leave his Shabbat limit, i.e., he went out to testify that he had seen the new moon or for some life-saving purpose, and they said to him along the way: The action has already been performed, and there is no need for you to travel for that purpose, he has two thousand cubits in each direction from the location where he was standing when this was told to him. If he was within his original limit, it is considered as if he had not left his limit, and he may return to his original location. The Sages formulated a principle: All who go out to battle and save lives may return to their original locations on Shabbat.

4:4 With regard to a person who was sitting along the road on Shabbat eve toward nightfall, unaware that he was within the city's Shabbat limit, and when he stood up after Shabbat had already commenced, he saw that he was near the town, i.e., within its limit, since he had not intended to acquire his place of residence in the town, he may not enter it, but rather he measures two thousand cubits from his place; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: He may enter the town. Rabbi Yehuda said: It once happened that Rabbi Tarfon entered a town on Shabbat without intention from the beginning of Shabbat to establish residence in the city.

4:5 With regard to one who was sleeping along the road on Shabbat eve and did not know that night had fallen, he has two thousand cubits in each direction; this is the statement of Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri, who maintains that knowledge and awareness are not necessary for one to acquire residence, but rather, a person's presence in a given location establishes residence there. But the Rabbis say: He has only four cubits, as since he did not knowingly acquire residence, he did not establish a Shabbat limit. Rabbi Eliezer says: He has only four cubits total and he is in the middle of them, i.e., he has two cubits in each direction. Rabbi Yehuda says: He may walk four cubits in any direction he wishes. But Rabbi Yehuda agrees that if he selected for himself the direction in which he wants to walk those four cubits, he cannot retract and walk four cubits in a different direction.

4:6 With regard to a case where there were two people in this situation, positioned in such a way that part of the four cubits of one were subsumed within the four cubits of the other, they may each bring food and eat together in the shared area in the middle, provided that the one does not carry anything

from his four-cubit limit into that of his fellow. With regard to a case where there were three people in this situation, and certain parts of the four cubits of the middle one were subsumed within the respective limits of each of the others, so that he shared a certain area with each of them, he is permitted to eat with either of them, and they are both permitted to eat with him; but the two outer ones are forbidden to eat with each other, since they share no common area. Rabbi Shimon said: To what is this comparable? It is like three courtyards that open into one another, and also open into a public domain. If the two outer courtyards established an eiruv with the middle one, the middle one is permitted to carry to the two outer ones, and they are permitted to carry to it, but the two outer courtyards are prohibited to carry from one to the other, as they did not establish an eiruv with one another.

4:7 With regard to one who was coming along the way on Shabbat eve, and it grew dark while he was traveling, and he was familiar with a tree or a fence located two thousand cubits from his current location, and two thousand cubits from his house, and he said: My residence is beneath that tree, rather than in his present location, he has not said anything, as he did not establish a fixed location as his residence. If, however, he said: My residence is at the tree's trunk, he acquired residence there, and he may therefore walk from the place he is standing to the trunk of the tree two thousand cubits away, and from the trunk of the tree to his house, an additional two thousand cubits. Consequently, he walks after nightfall a total of four thousand cubits.

4:8 If one is not familiar with a tree or any other noticeable landmark, or if he is not an expert in the halakha, unaware that residence can be established from a distance, and he said: My residence is at my current location, then his presence at his current location acquires for him the right to walk two thousand cubits in each direction. The manner in which the two thousand cubits are measured is the subject of a tannaitic dispute. These cubits are measured circularly, i.e., as a circle with a radius of two thousand cubits; this is the statement of Rabbi Hanina ben Antigenos. And the Rabbis say: These are measured squarely, i.e., as a square tablet, with each side measuring four thousand cubits, so that he gains the corners. He is permitted to walk from the middle to the corners of the square as well, a distance of approximately 2,800 cubits.

4:9 And this is the meaning of that which the Sages said: The pauper establishes an eiruv with his feet, i.e., one who does not have the bread required to establish an eiruv may walk anywhere within his Shabbat limit and declare: This is my residence, and his Shabbat limit is measured from that location. Rabbi Meir said: We have this leniency in effect only for a pauper, who does not have food for two meals. However, one who has bread may only establish residence with bread. Rabbi Yehuda says: This leniency is in effect for both a pauper and a wealthy person. The Sages said that one establishes an eiruv with bread only in order to be lenient with the wealthy person, so that he need not exert himself and go out and establish an eiruv with his feet. Instead, he can appoint an agent to place bread for him in that location. This, however, does not negate the option of personally going to that location in order to establish residence without bread.

4:10 If a person set out to go on a Shabbat eve to a town for which an eiruv is established in order to go there on Shabbat, and another person caused him to return home, he himself is permitted to go to that city on Shabbat, and for all the other residents of the town it is prohibited to go there. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: Anyone who can establish an eiruv, and negated his residence in his original place, and did not establish an eiruv, i.e., he did not at least state that he seeks to establish residence somewhere else, is likened to both a donkey driver, who walks behind the animal and prods it, and a camel driver, who walks before the animal and leads it, in the sense that he is pulled in two opposite directions. Due to the uncertainty with regard to the location of his Shabbat limit, his movement is restricted as though his residence was established in both his city and at a location along the way to the other city. He may not venture beyond two thousand cubits from either location.

4:11 One who intentionally, not for the purpose of performing a mitzva, went out beyond his Shabbat limit, even if only one cubit, may not reenter. Rabbi Eliezer says: If he went out two cubits he may reenter; however, if he went out three cubits he may not reenter. With regard to one for whom it grew dark while he was traveling outside the Shabbat limit of the town where he was heading, even if he was only one cubit outside the limit he may not enter the town. Rabbi Shimon says: Even if he was fifteen cubits beyond the limit he may enter the town, because the surveyors do not precisely demarcate the measures; rather, they mark the Shabbat limit within the two thousand cubits, due to those who err.

5:1 How does one extend the boundaries of cities in order to ensure that all its protrusions are included within the borders of the city? He extends a straight line across the edge of the city, and if a house is recessed and another house protrudes, or a turret [pagum] is recessed and another turret protrudes from that line, and similarly, if there were remnants of walls ten handbreadths high, and bridges and monuments over graves in which there is a residence, one extends the measure of that side of the city as though there were other structures opposite them in the adjacent corner of the city. And prior to measuring the Shabbat limit, one renders the city like a square tablet so that it gains the corners, although there are actually no houses in those corners.

5:2 One allocates a karpof to every city, i.e., the measure of a karpof, which is slightly more than seventy cubits, is added to every city, and the two thousand cubits of the Shabbat limit are measured from there; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: They spoke of the addition of a karpof only with regard to the space between two adjacent cities. How so? If this city has seventy cubits and a remainder vacant on one side, and that city has seventy cubits and a remainder vacant on the adjacent side, and the two areas of seventy-plus cubits overlap, the karpof combines the two cities into one.

5:3 And likewise, in the case of three villages that are arranged as a triangle, if there are only $141 \frac{1}{3}$ cubits separating between the two outer villages, the middle village combines the three villages into one.

5:4 One may measure a Shabbat limit only with a rope fifty cubits long, no less and no more, as will be explained in the Gemara. And one may measure the limit only at the level of one's heart, i.e., whoever comes to measure the limit must hold the rope next to his chest. If one was measuring the limit and he reached a canyon or a fence, the height of the fence and the depth of the canyon are not counted toward the two thousand cubits; rather, he spans it and then resumes his measurement. Two people hold the two ends of the rope straight across the canyon or the fence, and the distance is measured as though the area were completely flat. If one reached a hill, he does not measure its height; rather, he spans the hill as if it were not there and then resumes his measurement, provided he does not thereby go out beyond the city's Shabbat limit, as those watching the surveyor might mistakenly think the limit extends to that point. If, due to the width of the canyon or hill, he cannot span it, with regard to this situation Rabbi Dostai bar Yannai said in the name of Rabbi Meir: I heard that one may pierce hills. In other words, one measures the distance as if there were a hole from one side of the hill to the other, so that in effect, he measures only the horizontal distance and ignores the differences in elevation.

5:5 One may measure the Shabbat limit only with an expert surveyor. If it is discovered that the surveyor extended the limit in one place and reduced it in another place, so that the line marking the Shabbat limit is not straight, one accepts the measurement of the place where he extended the limit and straightens the limit accordingly. Similarly, if the surveyor extended the limit for one and reduced it for another, one accepts the extended measurement. And furthermore, even a gentile slave and even a gentile maidservant, whose testimonies are generally considered unreliable, are trustworthy to say: The Shabbat limit extended until here; as the Sages did not state the matter, the laws of Shabbat limits, to be stringent, but rather to be lenient. The prohibition to walk more than two thousand cubits is rabbinic in origin and is therefore interpreted leniently.

5:6 Although this chapter as a whole deals with halakhot governing the joining of Shabbat boundaries, this mishna returns to the halakhot governing a joining of courtyards. If a private city, which does not have many residents, grows and becomes a heavily populated public city, one may establish a joining of the courtyards for all of it, as long as it does not include a public domain as defined by Torah law. And if a public city loses residents over time and becomes a private city, one may not establish an eiruv for all of it unless one maintains an area outside the eiruv that is like the size of the city of Hadasha in Judea, which has fifty residents. Carrying within the eiruv is permitted, but it remains prohibited to carry in the area excluded from the eiruv. The reason for this requirement is to ensure that the laws of eiruv will not be forgotten. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Shimon says: The excluded area need not be so large; rather, it is sufficient to exclude three courtyards with two houses each.

5:7 One who was to the east of his home when Shabbat began, and he had said to his son before Shabbat: Establish an eiruv for me to the west; or, if he was to the west of his home and he had said to his son: Establish an eiruv for me to

the east, the halakha is as follows: If there is a distance of two thousand cubits from his current location to his house, and the distance to his eiruv is greater than this, he is permitted to walk to his house, and from there he may walk two thousand cubits in every direction, but it is prohibited for him to walk to the spot where his son had deposited his eiruv. If the distance from one's current location to his eiruv is two thousand cubits, and the distance to his house is greater than this, he is prohibited from walking to his house, and he is permitted to walk to the spot of his eiruv, and from there he may walk two thousand cubits in every direction. In other words, with regard to the Shabbat limit, one's place of residence for Shabbat cannot be more than two thousand cubits from his physical location when Shabbat begins. One who places his eiruv in the outskirts of the city, i.e., within an area of slightly more than seventy cubits surrounding the city, it is as though he has not done anything. The two thousand cubits of one's Shabbat limit are measured from the edge of the outskirts of the city even if there is no eiruv, and one therefore gains nothing from placing an eiruv within this area. If, however, he placed his eiruv outside the city's boundary, even if he placed it only one cubit beyond the city, what he gains in distance through his eiruv on one side of the city he loses on the other side.

5:8 The residents of a large city may walk through an entire small city, and the residents of a small city may not walk through an entire large city, even if part of it is located more than two thousand cubits from their city. How so? One who was in a large city and placed his eiruv in a small city, or one who was in a small city and placed his eiruv in a large city, may walk through the entire city in which he placed his eiruv and another two thousand cubits beyond it, as the entire city is considered as though it were only four cubits. Rabbi Akiva says: He has only two thousand cubits from the place of his eiruv, as the actual area of the city is included in the calculation.

5:9 Rabbi Akiva said to the Rabbis: Do you not concede to me that one who places his eiruv in a cave has only two thousand cubits from the place of his eiruv, and that consequently the entire cave is not considered as merely four cubits? The Rabbis said to him: When does this apply? When the cave has no residents. But if it has residents, it is considered as though it were only four cubits, and one may walk through all of it and another two thousand cubits beyond it. Consequently, the halakha with regard to an eiruv placed inside a cave is sometimes more lenient than the halakha governing an eiruv placed in the area above the cave. If one places his eiruv inside a cave that has residents, he has two thousand cubits beyond the cave; if he places it above the cave, where there are no residents, he has only two thousand cubits from the place of his eiruv. And as for one who is measuring his Shabbat limit, with regard to whom the Sages said that one gives him two thousand cubits, that measurement applies even if the end of his measurement terminates in the middle of a cave. He may not walk further into the cave, even if the cave is inhabited.

6:1 One who resides with a gentile in the same courtyard, or one who lives in the same courtyard with one who does not accept the principle of eiruv, even though he is not a gentile, such as a Samaritan [Kuti], this person renders it

prohibited for him to carry from his own house into the courtyard or from the courtyard into his house, unless he rents this person's rights in the courtyard, as will be explained below. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov says: Actually, the gentile does not render it prohibited for one to carry, unless there are two Jews living in the same courtyard who themselves would prohibit one another from carrying if there were no eiruv. In such a case, the presence of the gentile renders the eiruv ineffective. However, if only one Jew lives there, the gentile does not render it prohibited for him to carry in the courtyard.

6:2 Rabban Gamliel said: There was an incident involving a certain Sadducee who lived with us in the same alleyway in Jerusalem, who renounced his rights to the alleyway before Shabbat. And Father said to us: Hurry and take out your utensils to the alleyway to establish possession of it, before he changes his mind and takes out his own utensils so as to reclaim his rights, in which case he would render it prohibited for you to use the entire alleyway. Rabbi Yehuda says: Rabban Gamliel's father spoke to them with a different formulation, saying: Hurry and do whatever you must do in the alleyway prior to Shabbat, before he takes out his utensils and renders it prohibited for you to use the alleyway. In other words, you may not bring out utensils to the alleyway at all on Shabbat, as the institution of an eiruv cannot be used in the neighborhood of a Sadducee. This is because, even if he renounced his rights to the alleyway, he can always retract and reclaim them.

6:3 If one of the residents of a courtyard forgot and did not participate in an eiruv with the other residents before Shabbat, and on Shabbat he renounced his rights in the courtyard to the other residents, his house is prohibited both to him, who forgot to establish an eiruv, and to them, the other residents, to bring in objects from the courtyard to his house or to take them out from his house into the courtyard. But their houses are permitted both to him and to them, for taking objects out into the courtyard and for bringing them in. If they gave away their rights in the courtyard to him, i.e., if they renounced their rights in his favor, he is permitted to carry from his house into the courtyard, but they are prohibited from doing so. If two residents of the courtyard forgot to establish an eiruv, and the others renounced their rights in the courtyard in their favor, they prohibit one another. In this scenario, the courtyard would belong to both of them, but each individual house remains the domain of its owner. It would therefore be prohibited for each of these residents to carry into the courtyard. For one resident may give away and receive rights in a domain, whereas two residents may only give away rights in a domain, but they may not receive rights in a domain. Since they did not establish an eiruv, it is unreasonable for the other residents of the courtyard to give away their rights in the domain, as the two who are prohibited because they did not participate in the eiruv render it prohibited for each other to carry.

6:4 The mishna poses a general question: When may one give away rights in a domain? Beit Shammai say: While it is still day, i.e., before the onset of Shabbat; and Beit Hillel say: Even after nightfall, when it is already Shabbat. The mishna cites another dispute: If one gave away his rights in his courtyard

to the other residents of the courtyard, renouncing them after having forgotten to establish an eiruv with them the previous day, and then he carried something out from his house into the courtyard – whether unwittingly, forgetting that he had renounced his rights, or intentionally, he renders carrying prohibited for all the residents of the courtyard, for his action cancels his renunciation; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he acted intentionally, he renders carrying prohibited; but if he acted unwittingly, he does not render carrying prohibited.

6:5 If a homeowner was in partnership with his neighbors, with this one in wine and with that one in wine, they need not establish an eiruv, for due to their authentic partnership they are considered to be one household, and no further partnership is required. If, however, he was in partnership with this one in wine and with that one in oil, they must establish an eiruv. As they are not partners in the same item, they are not all considered one partnership. Rabbi Shimon says: In both this case and that case, i.e., even if he partners with his neighbors in different items, they need not establish an eiruv.

6:6 With regard to five groups of people who spent Shabbat in one hall [teraklin] that was subdivided by partitions into separate rooms, each of which had a separate entrance to a courtyard that was shared with other houses, Beit Shammai say: An eiruv is required for each and every group, i.e., each group must contribute separately to the eiruv of the courtyard, as each is considered a different house. And Beit Hillel say: One eiruv suffices for all of them, as the partitions do not render the different sections separate houses. And Beit Hillel concede that when some of them occupy separate rooms or upper stories, they require a separate eiruv for each and every group, and the fact that they are in the same building does not render them one unified group.

6:7 In the case of brothers who were eating at their father's table and sleeping in their own houses in the same courtyard, a separate contribution to the eiruv is required for each and every one of them. Therefore, if one of them forgot and did not contribute to the eiruv, he must renounce his rights in the courtyard in order to render carrying in the courtyard permitted to the rest of the courtyard's residents. When do they state this halakha? They state it when they take their eiruv elsewhere in the courtyard, i.e., to the house of one of the other residents. But if the eiruv was coming to them, i.e., if it was placed in their father's house, or if there are no other residents with the brothers and their father in the courtyard, they are not required to establish an eiruv, as they are considered like a single individual living in a courtyard.

6:8 If five courtyards open into one another and also open into an alleyway, the following distinctions apply: If the residents of the courtyard established an eiruv in the courtyards and did not merge the courtyards that open into the alleyway, they are permitted to carry in the courtyards and they are prohibited to carry in the alleyway. The eiruv they established cannot also serve as a merging of the courtyards that open into the alleyway. And if they merged the courtyards of the alleyway, they are permitted to carry both here, in the alleyway, and there, in the courtyards. If they established an eiruv in the courtyards and also merged the courtyards of the alleyway, and one of the

residents of the courtyard forgot and did not contribute to the eiruv in his courtyard, but did participate in the merging of the courtyards in the alleyway, they are permitted both here and there, as the merging of courtyards in the alleyway serves as an effective eiruv for the courtyards as well.

However, if one of the residents of the alleyway forgot and did not participate in the merging of courtyards that open into the alleyway, they are permitted to carry in the courtyards and prohibited from carrying in the alleyway, as the principle is: An alleyway is to its courtyards as a courtyard is to its houses.

6:9 With regard to two courtyards, one of which was within the other, and the outer one opened into the public domain, the following distinctions apply: If the inner courtyard established an eiruv for itself and the outer one did not establish an eiruv, carrying in the inner one is permitted and carrying in the outer one is prohibited. If the outer courtyard established an eiruv and the inner one did not, carrying in both is prohibited, as the residents of the inner courtyard pass through the outer one, and are considered to a certain extent as residents of the courtyard who did not participate in the eiruv. If this courtyard established an eiruv for itself, and that courtyard also established an eiruv for itself, but they did not establish a joint eiruv with one another, this one is permitted by itself, and that one is permitted by itself, but they may not carry from one to the other. Rabbi Akiva prohibits carrying in the outer one even in such a case, as the right of entry to the outer courtyard enjoyed by the residents of the inner courtyard renders it prohibited. And the Rabbis disagree and say: The right of entry enjoyed by the residents of the inner courtyard does not render it prohibited. Since the residents of the inner courtyard do not use the outer one other than to pass through it, and they are permitted to carry in their own courtyard, they do not render it prohibited to carry in the outer courtyard.

6:10 If one resident of the outer courtyard forgot and did not contribute to the eiruv, carrying in the inner courtyard is permitted and in the outer one is prohibited. If one resident of the inner courtyard forgot and did not contribute to the eiruv, they are both prohibited, as the right of way enjoyed by the members of the inner courtyard through the outer courtyard renders the outer one prohibited as well. If the residents of both courtyards put their eiruv in one place, and one person, whether he was from the inner courtyard or from the outer one, forgot and did not contribute to the eiruv, they are both prohibited for carrying within them, as the two courtyards are treated as one. And if the courtyards belonged to individuals, i.e., if only one person lived in each courtyard, they are not required to establish an eiruv, as this requirement applies only to a courtyard occupied by multiple residents.

7:1 If there is a window in a wall that separates between two courtyards, and the window measures four by four handbreadths and is within ten handbreadths of the ground, the inhabitants of the courtyards establish two eiruvim, one for each courtyard. And if they desire, they may establish one eiruv, thereby merging the two courtyards, as they may be considered as one due to the window. However, if the window measures less than four by four handbreadths, or if it is above ten handbreadths from the ground, it is no longer considered a valid opening, and the two courtyards cannot be considered a single courtyard.

Therefore, the residents establish two eiruvim, but they may not establish one eiruv.

7:2 If a wall between two courtyards is ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide, the residents of the courtyard establish two eiruvim, a separate one for each courtyard, but they may not establish one eiruv. If there was produce on top of the wall, these residents of one courtyard may ascend from this side and eat from it, and those residents of the other courtyard may ascend from that side and eat from it, provided that they do not lower the produce down from on top of the wall to one of the courtyards. If the wall was breached, the following distinction applies: If the breach was up to ten cubits wide, they establish two eiruvim, and if they desire, they may establish one eiruv, as it is similar to an entrance, like any opening less than ten cubits wide. If the breach was more than this, they establish one eiruv, and they may not establish two, as a breach of this size nullifies the partition and joins the two courtyards into a single domain.

7:3 With regard to a ditch between two courtyards that is ten handbreadths deep and four handbreadths wide, it is considered a full-fledged partition, and the residents of the courtyard establish two eiruvim, one for each courtyard, but they may not establish one eiruv. Even if the ditch is filled with straw or hay, it is not regarded as sealed and is therefore not nullified. However, if the ditch is filled with dirt or pebbles, the residents establish one eiruv, but they may not establish two eiruvim, as the ditch is nullified and considered nonexistent.

7:4 If one placed a board four handbreadths wide across the ditch so that he could cross it, and similarly, if two balconies [gezuztraot] in two different courtyards are opposite one another, and one placed a board four handbreadths wide between them, the residents of the courtyards or balconies establish two eiruvim, and if they desire, they may establish one, as the board serves as an opening and a passageway between them. If the width of the plank is less than four handbreadths, the residents establish two eiruvim, but they may not establish one eiruv.

7:5 With regard to a haystack that is positioned between two courtyards and is ten handbreadths high, it has the status of a partition, and therefore the residents of the courtyards may establish two eiruvim, and they may not establish one eiruv. These, the inhabitants of one courtyard, may feed their animals from here, from one side of the haystack, and those, the inhabitants of the other courtyard, may feed their animals from there, from the other side of the haystack. There is no concern that the haystack might become too small to serve as a partition. If the height of the hay was reduced to less than ten handbreadths across its entire length, its legal status is no longer that of a partition. Consequently, the residents of both courtyards establish one eiruv, and they do not establish two eiruvim.

7:6 How does one merge the courtyards that open into the alleyway, if a person wishes to act on behalf of all the residents of the alleyway? He places a barrel filled with his own food and says: This is for all the residents of the alleyway. For this gift to be acquired by the others, someone must accept it on their behalf, and the tanna therefore teaches that he may confer possession to

them even by means of his adult son or daughter, and likewise by means of his Hebrew slave or maidservant, whom he does not own, and by means of his wife. These people may acquire the eiruv on behalf of all the residents of the alleyway. However, he may not confer possession by means of his minor son or daughter, nor by means of his Canaanite slave or maidservant, because they cannot effect acquisition, as ownership of objects that come into their possession is as if those objects came into his possession. Consequently, the master or father cannot confer possession to the slave or minor respectively on behalf of others as their acquisition is ineffective and the object remains in his own possession.

7:7 If the food in the barrel for the merging of the alleyway diminished and was less than the requisite measure, one may add a little of his own and confer possession to the others, and he need not inform them of his addition. However, if new residents were added to the residents of the alleyway, he may add food on behalf of those residents and confer possession to them, and he must inform the new residents of their inclusion in the merging of alleyways.

7:8 What is the measure of food required for a merging of the alleyways? When the residents of the alley are numerous, food for two meals is sufficient for all of them; when they are few, less than a certain number, a dried fig-bulk for each and every one of them is enough.

7:9 Rabbi Yosei said: In what case is this statement said? It is said with regard to the beginning of an eiruv, when it is initially established. However, with regard to the remnants of an eiruv, e.g., if the eiruv decreased in size on Shabbat, it remains valid if even any amount remains. And in general they said that it is necessary to join the courtyards, even though a merging of the alleyways was already in place, only so that the halakhic category of eiruv will not be forgotten by the children, i.e., so that the next generation should be aware that an eiruv can be established for a courtyard, for otherwise they would be entirely unaware of this halakhic category.

7:10 One may join courtyards and merge alleyways with all types of food, except for water and salt, as they are not considered foods. This is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Yehoshua says that a different limitation applies: A whole loaf may be used for an eiruv. With regard to a baked product even the size of a se'a, if it consists of pieces, one may not join courtyards with it. However, with regard to a loaf, even one the size of an issar, if it is whole, one may join courtyards with it.

7:11 A person may give a ma'a coin to a grocer or a baker, if they live in the same alleyway or courtyard, so that the grocer or baker will confer upon him possession of wine or bread for a merging of the alleyway or an eiruv, if other residents come to them to purchase these products for that purpose. This is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. And the Rabbis say: His money did not confer possession on him, as the transfer of money alone is not a valid mode of acquisition and cannot confer possession. One must perform a valid mode of acquisition, e.g., pulling an article into one's possession, to transfer ownership. And the Rabbis concede with regard to all other people, apart from grocers and bakers, that if one gave them money for the food of an eiruv, his money confers possession upon him, as one may establish an eiruv for a person

only with his knowledge and at his bidding. With regard to a grocer or baker, the person giving the money does not intend to appoint the grocer or the baker as his agent and the money itself does not effect an acquisition, and consequently, he did not accomplish anything. With regard to anyone else, however, there is no doubt that he must have intended to appoint him his agent, and his act is effective. Rabbi Yehuda said: In what case is this statement said? It is said with regard to a joining of Shabbat boundaries, but with regard to a joining of courtyards, one may establish an eiruv for a person either with his knowledge or without his knowledge. The reason is because one may act for a person's benefit in his absence, but one may not act to a person's disadvantage in his absence. As a participant in a joining of courtyards benefits from his inclusion in the eiruv, his consent is not required. However, with regard to a joining of Shabbat boundaries, although it enables one to go farther in one direction, he loses the option of traveling in the opposite direction. When an action is to a person's disadvantage, or if it entails both benefits and disadvantages, one may act on that person's behalf only if he has been explicitly appointed his agent.

8:1 How does one participate in the joining of Shabbat boundaries? One who wishes to establish a joining of Shabbat boundaries for himself and others places a barrel of food in the location he designates as their place of residence, and says: This is for all the residents of my town, for anyone who wishes to go on Shabbat to a house of mourning or to a house of a wedding feast situated beyond the Shabbat limit. Anyone who accepted upon himself while it was still day, i.e., before the onset of Shabbat, that he will rely on the eiruv, is permitted to rely upon it; but if one did so only after nightfall, he is prohibited to rely upon it, as the principle is that one may not establish an eiruv after nightfall.

8:2 What is the measure for an joining of Shabbat boundaries? It consists of a quantity of food sufficient for two meals for each and every one of those included in the eiruv. The tanna'im disagree with regard to the size of these two meals. It is referring to one's food that he eats on a weekday and not on Shabbat; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: It is referring to the amount he eats on Shabbat and not on a weekday. And both this Sage, Rabbi Meir, and that Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, intended to be lenient, as Rabbi Meir maintains that people eat more food on Shabbat, whereas Rabbi Yehuda believes that they consume more on a weekday. Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka says: Food for two meals is the size of a loaf bought with a pundeyon, which is one-forty-eighth of a sela, when four se'a of wheat are sold for a sela. Rabbi Shimon says: Food for two meals is two of three parts of a loaf, when three loaves are prepared from a kav of wheat. In other words, the measure is two-thirds of a loaf the size of one-third of a kav. Having discussed measures with regard to a loaf of bread, the mishna states that half of this loaf is the amount called a half [peras], a measure relevant for the halakhot of a leprous house. If one enters a house afflicted with leprosy and remains there long enough to eat this amount of food, the clothes he is wearing become ritually impure. And half of its half, a quarter of this loaf, is the amount of ritually impure food that disqualifies the body. In other words, impure food of this

amount imparts ritual impurity to the body of the eater, and disqualifies him by rabbinic law from eating teruma.

8:3 If both the residents of houses that open directly into a courtyard and the residents of apartments that open onto a balcony from which stairs lead down to that courtyard forgot and did not establish an eiruv between them, anything in the courtyard that is ten handbreadths high, e.g., a mound or a post, is part of the balcony. The residents of the apartments open to the balcony may transfer objects to and from their apartments onto the mound or post. Any post or mound that is lower than this height is part of the courtyard. A similar halakha applies to an embankment that surrounds a cistern or a rock: If the embankments that surround a cistern or rock are ten handbreadths high, they belong to the balcony; if they are lower than this, they may be used only by the inhabitants of the courtyard. In what case are these matters, the halakha that anything higher than ten handbreadths belongs to the balcony, stated? When the mound or embankment is near the balcony. But in a case where the embankment or mound is distant from it, even if it is ten handbreadths high, the right to use the embankment or mound goes to the members of the courtyard. And what is considered near? Anything that is not four handbreadths removed from the balcony.

8:4 With regard to one who placed his eiruv of courtyards in a gatehouse or in a portico, a roofed structure without walls or with incomplete walls, or one who deposited it in a balcony, this is not a valid eiruv. And one who resides there, in any of these structures, does not render it prohibited for the homeowner and the other residents of the courtyard to carry, even if he did not contribute to the eiruv. If, however, one deposited his eiruv in a hay shed or in a cowshed or in a woodshed or in a storehouse, this is a valid eiruv, as it is located in a properly guarded place. And one who resides there with permission, if he neglected to contribute to the eiruv, he renders it prohibited for the homeowner and the other residents of the courtyard to carry. Rabbi Yehuda says: If the homeowner has there, in the hay shed or the other places listed above, a right of usage, i.e., if he is entitled to use all or part of the area for his own purposes, then the one who lives there does not render it prohibited for the homeowner, as the area is considered the homeowner's quarters, and the person living there is classified as a member of his household.

8:5 One who leaves his house, which is located in a shared courtyard, and goes to spend Shabbat in a different town, whether he is a gentile or a Jew, he renders it prohibited for the other residents to use the courtyard as though he were still at home; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: He does not render it prohibited for them, as he left behind him an empty residence. Rabbi Yosei says: A gentile renders it prohibited but a Jew does not render it prohibited, as it is not the manner of a Jew to come home on Shabbat. A Jew will not return home, therefore his empty residence does not render it prohibited. By contrast, a gentile might return over the course of Shabbat. Therefore, he is not considered to have fully uprooted himself from his house, and he renders it prohibited. Rabbi Shimon says: Even if the Jew left his house and went to spend Shabbat with his daughter who lived in the same town, he does

not render it prohibited. Although he can return home at any time, it is assumed that he has already removed from his mind any thought of going back there and has established his Shabbat residence away from his home.

8:6 In the case of a cistern that is located between two courtyards, situated partly in each courtyard, one may not draw water from it on Shabbat, lest the residents of one courtyard draw water from the domain of the other courtyard, unless a partition ten handbreadths high was erected for it as a separation between the domains. This partition is effective whether it is below, in the water, or whether it is within the airspace of the cistern below the rim, above the surface of the water. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: This is the subject of an early dispute of tanna'im, as Beit Shammai said that the partition, which permits drawing water, must be placed below; and Beit Hillel said it should be positioned above. Rabbi Yehuda said: A partition is no better than the wall between them. A wall dividing the two courtyards passes over the cistern, therefore it is not necessary to erect an additional partition in the cistern's airspace.

8:7 With regard to a water channel that passes through a courtyard, the residents may not draw water from it on Shabbat, unless they erected for it a partition ten handbreadths high at the entrance and at the exit of the courtyard. Rabbi Yehuda says: There is no need for a special partition, as the wall that runs on top of it, i.e., the courtyard wall, is considered as a partition. Rabbi Yehuda said: There was an incident involving a water channel that passed through the courtyards of the town of Avel, from which the residents would draw water from it on Shabbat by the authority of the Elders, relying on the courtyard wall suspended above it. They said to him: It is due to the fact that channel was not of the size that requires a partition, i.e., it was less than ten handbreadths deep or less than ten handbreadths wide, it was permitted to draw water from it even without a partition.

8:8 With regard to a balcony that extends over a body of water, if a hole was opened in the floor, its residents may not draw water from it through the hole on Shabbat, unless they erected for it a partition ten handbreadths high around the hole. It is permitted to draw water by means of that partition, whether it is positioned above the balcony, in which case the partition is seen as descending downward, or whether it is placed below the balcony. And likewise, with regard to two such balconies, one above the other, if they erected a partition for the upper balcony but they did not erect one for the lower one, the residents are both prohibited from drawing water through the upper one, unless they establish an eiruv between them.

8:9 With regard to a courtyard that is less than four cubits by four cubits in area, one may not pour waste water into it on Shabbat, unless a pit was fashioned to receive the water, and the pit holds two se'a in volume from its edge below. This halakha applies whether the pit was fashioned outside the courtyard or whether it was dug inside the courtyard itself. The only difference is as follows: If the pit was dug outside in the adjoining public domain, it is necessary to arch over it, so that the water will not flow into the public domain. If it was dug inside the courtyard, it is not necessary to arch over it.

8:10 Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov says: In the case of a drainage ditch whose first four cubits are arched over in the public domain, one may pour waste water into it on Shabbat. And the Rabbis say: Even if a roof or a courtyard is a hundred cubits in area, one may not pour water directly onto the mouth of the drainage ditch. However, he may pour it upon the roof, from which the water spills into the drain of its own accord. A courtyard and a portico, a roofed but unwalled structure in front of a house, combine for the four cubits by virtue of which it is permitted to pour water even into a courtyard that lacks a pit.

8:11 And likewise, with regard to two upper stories [deyotat], one opposite the other in the same small courtyard, if the residents of one of them fashioned a pit in the courtyard, and the residents of the other did not fashion a pit, those who fashioned a pit are permitted to pour their waste water into the courtyard, whereas those who did not fashion a pit are prohibited to do so.

9:1 All the roofs of the city are considered one domain. It is permitted to carry from one roof to another, even if the residents of the houses did not establish an eiruv between them. The Sages did not prohibit carrying between roofs, as it is rare to transfer an item from one roof to another. However, it is only permitted to transfer objects between roofs provided that one roof is neither ten handbreadths higher nor ten handbreadths lower than the adjacent roof. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Each and every one of the roofs is a domain in and of itself. It is permitted to carry from one to the other only if the residents of both houses established an eiruv. Rabbi Shimon says: Roofs, courtyards, and enclosures are all one domain with regard to vessels that were inside them when Shabbat began, and one may therefore carry from one of these areas to another. However, they are not one domain with regard to vessels that were inside the house when Shabbat began and were later taken into one of the above domains. A vessel that was inside the house when Shabbat began and subsequently carried to one of these areas may be carried from one roof, courtyard, or enclosure to another only if an eiruv had been established between the domains.

9:2 If a large roof was adjacent to a small roof, and the boundary between them was no wider than ten cubits, use of the large one is permitted, i.e., one may bring objects up to the roof from the house below and carry them on the roof, and use of the small one is prohibited. A similar halakha applies to a large courtyard that was breached into a small one, in a manner that one entire side of the small courtyard was breached, but the breach was less than ten cubits; it is permitted for the residents of the large courtyard to carry, but it is prohibited for the residents of the small one to do so. The rationale for this difference is because in that case, the legal status of the breach is like that of the entrance of the large courtyard. As the breach in the wall of the larger courtyard is surrounded on both sides by the remaining portions of that wall, and the breach is no greater than ten cubits wide, its legal status is like that of an entrance in the wall of the courtyard, and therefore it is permitted to carry in the large courtyard. With regard to the small courtyard, however, since one entire side of the small courtyard was breached, there remains no

partition whatsoever on that side and carrying in that courtyard is therefore prohibited. With regard to a courtyard that was breached into the public domain, and the breach was more than ten cubits wide, so that it cannot be considered an entrance, one who carries an object from inside the courtyard into the private domain, or from the private domain into it, is liable, as it ceases to be a private domain and is subsumed into the public domain. This is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. And the Rabbis disagree and say: One who carries from inside the courtyard into the public domain, or from the public domain into it, is exempt, because its legal status is like that of a karmelit. Although it ceases to be a private domain, it does not become a full-fledged public domain.

9:3 With regard to a courtyard that was breached on Shabbat into a public domain from two of its sides, and likewise with regard to a house that was breached from two of its sides, and likewise with regard to an alleyway whose cross beams or side posts were removed on Shabbat, the residents of that domain are permitted to carry there on that Shabbat, but are prohibited from doing so in the future. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yosei says: This cannot be the halakha, as if they are permitted to carry there on that Shabbat, they are likewise permitted to do so in the future, and if they are prohibited from carrying there in the future, they are also prohibited from carrying there on that Shabbat.

9:4 With regard to one who builds an upper story atop two houses on opposite sides of a public domain that passes beneath it, and likewise bridges with a thoroughfare beneath them that rest on walls on opposite sides of a public domain, one may carry beneath the upper story and beneath the bridge on Shabbat. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda, who maintains that these areas are considered private domains. And the Rabbis prohibit carrying in these areas. And furthermore, Rabbi Yehuda said: One may establish an eiruv even for an alleyway that is open at both ends, with no need for any additional measures, and the Rabbis prohibit doing so.

10:1 One who finds phylacteries outside the city on Shabbat, where they are in danger of becoming lost or damaged, brings them in to his house pair by pair by donning them in the manner in which they are typically donned for the mitzva. Rabban Gamliel says: He brings them in two pairs by two pairs. In what case is this statement that one is permitted to carry phylacteries inside said? It is with regard to old phylacteries, which have already been used and are designated for the mitzva. However, with regard to new ones, as it is unclear whether they are phylacteries or merely amulets in the form of phylacteries, he is exempt from performing the task. If one finds phylacteries tied in bundles or in wrapped piles, in which case he is unable to carry them in pairs, he sits there and waits with them until dark, guarding them until the conclusion of Shabbat, and then brings them in to his house. And in a time of danger, when it is dangerous to tarry outside town, he covers the phylacteries and proceeds on his way.

10:2 Rabbi Shimon says that there is an alternative method of transferring the phylacteries: One gives them to another who is less than four cubits from him, and the other passes them to another, until the phylacteries reach the

outermost courtyard of the city. Since carrying less than four cubits in a public domain is not prohibited by Torah law, in this case, the Sages permitted carrying in that manner due to the sanctity of the phylacteries. And similarly, with regard to one's son who was born in a field and may not be carried on Shabbat, since that is akin to carrying a burden in the public domain: One gives him to another, and the other passes him to another, even if it requires a hundred people. Rabbi Yehuda says: A person may even give a barrel to another, and the other may pass it to another, and in that way even take it beyond the Shabbat limit, provided that no one person carries it more than four cubits. They said to him: This barrel may not go a greater distance than the feet of its owner, i.e., it may not be carried any farther than its owner may walk.

10:3 One who was reading a sacred book in scroll form on Shabbat on an elevated, wide threshold, and the book rolled from his hand into the public domain, he may roll it back to himself, since one of its ends remains in his hand. If he was reading on top the roof, which is a full-fledged private domain, and the book rolled from his hand, as long as the edge of the book did not reach within ten handbreadths above the public domain, the book is still in its own domain, and he may roll it back to himself. However, once the book has reached within ten handbreadths above the public domain, it is prohibited to roll the book back to oneself. In that case, he may only turn it over onto the side with writing, so that the writing of the book will be facedown and not exposed and degraded. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if the scroll is removed only a needle breadth from the ground, he rolls it back to himself. Rabbi Shimon says: Even if the scroll is on the ground itself, he rolls it back to himself, as you have nothing that was instituted as a rabbinic decree to enhance the character of Shabbat as a day of rest that stands as an impediment before the rescue of sacred writings.

10:4 With regard to a ledge in front of a window, that is ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide, one may place objects upon it or remove them from it on Shabbat via the window. A person may stand in a private domain and move objects that are in a public domain, as there is no concern that he might mistakenly bring them into the private domain. Similarly, one may stand in a public domain and move objects in a private domain, provided that he does not carry them beyond four cubits in the public domain, which is prohibited on Shabbat.

10:5 However, a person may not stand in a private domain and urinate into a public domain, nor may one stand in a public domain and urinate into a private domain. And likewise, one may not spit in such a manner that the spittle passes from a private domain to a public domain or vice versa. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even once a person's spittle is gathered in his mouth, he may not walk four cubits in the public domain until he spits it out, for he would be carrying the accumulated spittle in his mouth, which is akin to carrying any other object.

10:6 A person may stand in a private domain and extend his head and drink in a public domain, and he may stand in a public domain and drink in a private domain, only if he brings his head and most of his body into the domain in which he drinks. And the same applies in a winepress, as will be explained in

the Gemara. A person standing in a public domain on Shabbat may catch water in a vessel from a gutter running along the side of a roof, if it is less than ten handbreadths off the ground, which is part of the public domain. And from a pipe that protrudes from the roof, one may drink in any manner, i.e., not only by catching the water in a vessel, but even by pressing his mouth directly against the spout.

10:7 With regard to a cistern in a public domain, with an embankment ten handbreadths high, i.e., the embankment constitutes a private domain by itself, if there is a window above the cistern, i.e., the window of an adjacent house is situated above the cistern, one may draw water from the cistern on Shabbat through the window, as it is permitted to carry from one private domain to another. Similarly, with regard to a garbage dump in a public domain that is ten handbreadths high, which means it has the status of a private domain, if there is a window above the pile of refuse that abuts the garbage dump, one may throw water from the window onto the dump on Shabbat, as it is permitted to carry from one private domain to another.

10:8 With regard to a tree that was hanging over the ground, i.e., its branches hung down on all sides like a tent so that it threw a shadow on the ground, if the tips of its branches are no higher than three handbreadths from the ground, one may carry under it. This applies even if the tree is planted in a public domain, as the branches form partitions which turn the enclosed area into a private domain. If its roots were three handbreadths higher than the ground, one may not sit on them, as it is prohibited to use a tree on Shabbat. Any part of a tree that is three handbreadths above the ground has the status of a tree with regard to this prohibition. With regard to the door to a rear court, i.e., a door that opens from a house to the courtyard situated behind it, which is typically not a proper door but merely a wooden board without hinges that closes off the doorway; and likewise bundles of thorns that seal a breach; and reed mats, one may not close an opening with them on Shabbat. This would be considered building or completing a building, unless they remain above the ground even when they are open.

10:9 A person may not stand in the private domain and open a door located in the public domain with a key, lest he inadvertently transfer the key from one domain to the other. Likewise, one may not stand in the public domain and open a door in the private domain with a key, unless in the latter case he erected a partition ten handbreadths high around the door and stands inside it. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. The Rabbis said to him: There was an incident at the poultry dealers' market in Jerusalem, where they would fatten fowl for slaughter (Rabbeinu Hananel), and they would lock the doors to their shops and place the key in the window that was over the door, which was more than ten handbreadths off the ground, and nobody was concerned about the possible violation of any prohibition. Rabbi Yosei says: That place was a market of wool dealers.

10:10 With regard to a bolt that secures a door in place and that has a thick knob [gelustera] at its end, a useful implement for a variety of purposes, the tanna'im disagree whether the bolt has the status of a vessel, and one may therefore close the door with it, or whether it is considered a cross beam,

which would mean that doing so is classified as building. Rabbi Eliezer prohibits its use, and Rabbi Yosei permits it. Rabbi Eliezer said: An incident occurred in a synagogue in Tiberias, where they were accustomed to treat use of this bolt as permitted, until Rabban Gamliel and the Elders came and prohibited it to them. Rabbi Yosei says that the opposite was the case: At first they were accustomed to treat use of this bolt as prohibited, and Rabban Gamliel and the Elders came and permitted it to them.

10:11 With regard to a bolt that is attached to the door, but owing to the length of the rope, it does not hang from the door but drags along the ground, one may lock a door with it in the Temple on Shabbat, as this is prohibited only by rabbinic decree, issued to enhance the character of Shabbat as a day of rest, and rabbinic decrees are not in effect in the Temple. However, one may not lock a door with this bolt in the country outside the Temple. And with regard to one that is not tied at all but rests entirely on the ground, it is prohibited in both places, in and outside the Temple, as the use of this bolt is considered building. Rabbi Yehuda says: One that rests entirely on the ground is permitted in the Temple, and one that drags along the ground is permitted even in the rest of the country.

10:12 One may restore the lower hinge pin of the door of a carriage, box, or cupboard that becomes dislocated to its place on Shabbat in the Temple, as this action is prohibited by rabbinic decree, which is not in effect in the Temple; but it may not be restored to its place in the rest of the country. And restoring the upper hinge pin is prohibited in both places, as this is considered building, a labor prohibited by Torah law, which applies everywhere. Rabbi Yehuda says: Restoring the upper hinge pin to its place is permitted in the Temple, while one may restore the lower one to its place even in the rest of the country.

10:13 One may return to its place a bandage that became detached from a wound on Shabbat in the Temple. In the Temple, this is not prohibited as a preventive measure, lest one come to spread the ointment and thereby perform the prohibited labor of smoothing. However, one may not return a bandage to its place in the rest of the country. If one sought to apply the bandage for the first time to an untreated wound on Shabbat, it is prohibited in both places. One may tie up on Shabbat a string [nima] that came loose from a harp used in the Temple, but not in the rest of the country. And tying the string to the harp for the first time is prohibited both here and there. A wart is an example of a blemish that temporarily disqualifies a priest from performing the Temple service, and disqualifies an animal from being offered on the altar; they regain their fitness once the wart is removed. Consequently, on Shabbat one may cut off a wart by hand in the Temple, as this constitutes a preparatory act required for the sacrificial service. However, he may not cut off a wart in the rest of the country. And if he seeks to cut off the wart with an instrument, it is prohibited in both places.

10:14 With regard to a priest who was injured on his finger on Shabbat, he may temporarily wrap it with a reed so that his wound is not visible while he is serving in the Temple. This leniency applies in the Temple, but not in the country, as it also heals the wound, and medical treatment is prohibited on

Shabbat due to rabbinic decree. If his intention is to draw blood from the wound or to absorb blood, it is prohibited in both places. One may scatter salt on Shabbat on the ramp that leads to the altar so that the priests will not slip on their way up. And likewise, one may draw water from the Cistern of the Exiles and from the Great Cistern, which were located in the Temple, by means of the wheel designed for drawing water, even on Shabbat. And one may draw water from the Heker Well only on a Festival.

10:15 With regard to the carcass of a creeping animal, of one of the eight species of reptile or rodent listed in Leviticus 11:29–30, one of the primary sources of ritual impurity that is found in the Temple, a priest should carry it out on Shabbat in his girdle, which was one of the priestly garments.

Although the girdle will be defiled by the carcass of the creeping animal, this is the best way to proceed, so as not to delay the removal of the impurity from the Temple. This is the statement of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka. Rabbi Yehuda says: The creeping animal carcass should be removed with wooden prongs, so as not to increase the impurity, as a wooden prong is not susceptible to impurity. It is obvious that on a weekday the creeping animal carcass is removed from wherever it is found in the Temple, but from where does one remove it on Shabbat? From the Sanctuary, from the Entrance Hall, and from the area in the courtyard between the Entrance Hall and the altar, the most sanctified precincts of the Temple. However, it need not be removed from the rest of the courtyard. This is the statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Nannas. Rabbi Akiva says: Any place where one is liable to be punished with karet if he intentionally enters there in a state of ritual impurity, and is liable to bring a sin-offering if he does so unwittingly, from there one must remove it. This includes the entire area of the Temple courtyard. And as for the rest of the places in the Temple, one covers the creeping animal carcass with a bowl [pesakhter] and leaves it there until the conclusion of Shabbat. Rabbi Shimon says that this is the principle: Wherever the Sages permitted something to you, they granted you only from your own, as they permitted to you only activities that are prohibited due to rabbinic decree, not labors prohibited by Torah law.