Mishnah Chullin
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Mishnah Chullin / משנה חולין

1:1	Everyone slaughters an animal, i.e., can perform halakhically valid slaughter, and their slaughter is valid, except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, lest they ruin their slaughter because they lack competence. And for all of them, when they slaughtered an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid. Slaughter performed by a gentile renders the animal an unslaughtered carcass, and the carcass imparts ritual impurity through carrying. In the case of one who slaughters an animal at night, and likewise in the case of the blind person who slaughters an animal, his slaughter is valid. In the case of one who slaughters an animal on Shabbat or on Yom Kippur, although he is liable to receive the death penalty, his slaughter is valid.
1:2	In the case of one who slaughters an animal with the smooth side of a hand sickle, which has both a smooth and a serrated side, or with a sharpened flint, or with a reed that was cut lengthwise and sharpened, his slaughter is valid. All slaughter [hakkol shoḥatin], and one may always slaughter, and one may slaughter with any item that cuts, except for the serrated side of the harvest sickle, a saw, the teeth of an animal when attached to its jawbone, and a fingernail, because they are serrated and they consequently strangle the animal and do not cut its windpipe and gullet as required. In the case of one who slaughters an animal with a harvest sickle, which is serrated with its teeth inclined considerably in one direction, in a forward direction, where the serrations do not tear the flesh, Beit Shammai deem the slaughter not valid and Beit Hillel deem it valid. And they both agree that if they smoothed its serrations so that they do not tear the flesh, its halakhic status is like that of a knife and one may slaughter with it.
1:3	With regard to one who slaughters an animal from within the cricoid cartilage that forms a complete ring at the top of the windpipe and left a thread breadth over the surface of the ring in its entirety intact, as the knife did not go beyond the ring toward the head of the animal, his slaughter is valid. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: It is valid even if he left a thread breadth over the majority of the surface of the ring.
1:4	One who slaughters from the sides of the throat, his slaughter is valid. One who pinches the neck of a bird offering from the sides, his pinching is not valid.One who slaughters from the nape [oref] of the neck, his slaughter is not valid. One who pinches a bird offering from the nape of the neck, his pinching is valid. One who slaughters from the throat, his slaughter is valid. One who pinches a bird offering from the throat, his pinching is not valid, as the entire nape is valid for pinching and the entire throat is valid for slaughter. It is found that that which is valid for slaughter is not valid for pinching and that which is valid for pinching is not valid for slaughter.
1:5	It is written with regard to bird offerings: “He shall bring his offering of doves, or of young pigeons” (Leviticus 1:14). The age that is fit for sacrifice in doves, mature birds, is unfit for sacrifice in pigeons, immature birds;the age that is fit for sacrifice in pigeons is unfit for sacrifice in doves. At the intermediate stage of the beginning of the yellowing of its plumage (see 22b), a bird is unfit both as this, a pigeon, and as that, a dove, since it is no longer a fledgling but is not yet a mature bird.
1:6	That which is fit in a red heifer is unfit in a heifer whose neck is broken; that which is fit in a heifer whose neck is broken is unfit in a red heifer. There is an element with which priests remain fit and Levites are unfit, and there is also an element with which Levites remain fit and priests are unfit. That which is ritually pure in an earthenware vessel is ritually impure in all the other types of vessels; that which is ritually pure in all the other types of vessels is ritually impure in an earthenware vessel. That which is ritually pure in wooden vessels is ritually impure in metal vessels; that which is ritually pure in metal vessels is ritually impure in wooden vessels. With regard to the obligation of separating teruma and tithes, the stage of development that is obligated in bitter almonds is exempt in sweet almonds; and the stage in development that is obligated in sweet almonds is exempt in bitter almonds.
1:7	Temed, a beverage produced from grape residue soaked in water, until it fermented, may not be purchased with second-tithe money to be drunk in Jerusalem, because it is not wine. And if three log of it fall into a ritual bath, its halakhic status is that of drawn water and it invalidates the ritual bath. Once it fermented, it is wine, and therefore it may be purchased with second-tithe money and it does not invalidate the ritual bath. With regard to brothers who are partners in the inheritance of their father, when they are obligated to add the premium [kalbon] to their annual half-shekel payment to the Temple, they are exempt from animal tithe; when they are obligated to separate animal tithe, they are exempt from adding the premium. Partners who pay the half-shekel are required to add the premium and are exempt from animal tithe. If they are not true partners, but their inheritance remains the property of the father, the sons are exempt from paying the premium, and they are obligated to separate animal tithe. Any situation where there is sale of one’s daughter as a Hebrew maidservant, i.e., when she is a minor, there is no fine of fifty sela paid to her father if she is raped or seduced, as that fine is paid to her father only when she is a young woman. And any situation where there is a fine paid to the father there is no sale. Any situation where there is the right of refusal for a minor girl married by her mother or brothers, enabling her to opt out of the marriage, there is no ḥalitza, as a minor girl whose husband died without children cannot perform ḥalitza. And any situation where there is ḥalitza, once she has reached majority, there is no right of refusal. Any situation where there is a shofar blast sounded on the eve of Shabbat or a Festival to stop the people from performing labor and to demarcate between the sacred and the profane, there is no havdala recited at the conclusion of the Shabbat or Festival in prayer and over a cup of wine. And any situation where there is havdala recited, there is no shofar blast sounded. How so? On a Festival that occurs on Shabbat eve, one sounds the shofar to stop the people from performing labor that is permitted on the Festival and prohibited on Shabbat and to demarcate between one sacred day and another; and one does not recite havdala, as that is recited only when the transition is from a sacred day to a profane day or from a day of greater sanctity to a day of lesser sanctity. The sanctity of Shabbat is greater than the sanctity of the Festival, and therefore havdala is not recited in this case. On a Festival that occurs at the conclusion of Shabbat, one recites havdala, but one does not sound the shofar. How does one recite havdala in that case; i.e., what is the formula of the blessing? It concludes: Who distinguishes between sacred and sacred, as opposed to the standard blessing at the conclusion of Shabbat: Who distinguishes between sacred and profane. Rabbi Dosa says that the formula is: Who distinguishes between greater sanctity and lesser sanctity.
2:1	In the case of one who slaughters by cutting one siman, i.e., the windpipe or the gullet, in a bird, and two simanim in an animal, his slaughter is valid, and the halakhic status of the majority of one siman is like that of the entire siman. Rabbi Yehuda says: The slaughter is not valid until he cuts the veins [haveridin], i.e., the major blood vessels in the neck. If one cut half of one siman in a bird or one and a half simanim in an animal, his slaughter is not valid. If one cut the majority of one siman in a bird or the majority of two simanim in an animal, his slaughter is valid.
2:2	With regard to one who slaughters by cutting two animals’ heads simultaneously, his slaughter is valid. If two people are grasping a knife and slaughtering one animal, even if each is holding a knife and slaughtering one above and one below, with each one slaughtering at a different point in the neck, their slaughter is valid.
2:3	If one decapitated the animal in one motion and did not slaughter the animal in the standard manner of drawing the knife back and forth, the slaughter is not valid. In a case where one was in the process of slaughtering the animal in the standard manner and he decapitated the animal in one motion, if the length of the knife is equivalent to the breadth of the animal’s entire neck, the slaughter is valid. If one was in the process of slaughtering two animals simultaneously, and he decapitated two heads in one motion, if the length of the knife is equivalent to the breadth of an entire neck of one of the animals, the slaughter is valid. In what case is this statement, that one must be concerned about the length of the knife, said? It is when one drew the knife back and did not draw it forth, or drew it forth and did not draw it back; but if he drew it back and forth, even if the knife was of any length, even if he slaughtered with a scalpel [be’izemel], the slaughter is valid. If a knife fell and slaughtered an animal, although the knife slaughtered the animal in the standard manner, the slaughter is not valid, as it is stated: “And you shall slaughter…and you shall eat” (Deuteronomy 27:7), from which it is derived: That which you slaughter you may eat, and that which was slaughtered on its own, you may not eat. If, when one was in the middle of slaughtering an animal, the knife fell and he lifted it and then completed the slaughter, or if his garments fell and he lifted them and then completed the slaughter, or if he had honed the knife and grew weary before completing the slaughter and another came and slaughtered the animal, if he interrupted the slaughter in one of these ways or in a different way for an interval equivalent to the duration of an act of slaughter, the slaughter is not valid. Rabbi Shimon says: The slaughter is not valid if he interrupted the slaughter for an interval equivalent to the duration of an examination.
2:4	If one cut the gullet in the standard manner of slaughter with a back-and-forth movement, and he severed the windpipe not in the standard manner, or if one severed the windpipe and thereafter cut the gullet, or if one cut one of the simanim and waited until the animal died, or if one cut one siman and concealed the knife beneath the second siman and severed it from below, Rabbi Yeshevav says: The animal is an unslaughtered carcass and imparts ritual impurity through contact with it and carrying it. Rabbi Akiva says: The animal is a tereifa, and although eating it is prohibited, it does not transmit ritual impurity. Rabbi Yeshevav stated a principle in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua: Any animal that was rendered unfit during its slaughter because the slaughter was not performed properly is an unslaughtered carcass; any animal whose slaughter was performed properly and another matter caused it to become unfit is a tereifa. And Rabbi Akiva conceded to his opinion.
2:5	In the case of one who slaughters a domesticated animal, an undomesticated animal, or a bird, and blood did not emerge from them during the slaughter, all of these are permitted for consumption and do not require the ritual washing of the hands as they may be eaten with ritually impure [mesoavot] hands, because they were not rendered susceptible to ritual impurity through contact with blood, which is one of the seven liquids that render food susceptible to impurity. Rabbi Shimon says: They were rendered susceptible to ritual impurity by means of the slaughter itself.
2:6	In the case of one who slaughters an animal that is in danger of imminent death, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The slaughter is valid only in a case where after the slaughter it convulses with its foreleg and with its hind leg. Rabbi Eliezer says: It is sufficient if blood spurted from the neck. Rabbi Shimon says: In the case of one who slaughters at night and the next day he awoke and found walls full of blood, the slaughter is valid, as it is clear that the blood spurted, and this is in accordance with the rule of Rabbi Eliezer. And the Rabbis say: It is valid only in a case where it convulses with its foreleg or with its hind leg, or in a case where it wags its tail. This is the halakha with regard to both a small animal, e.g., a sheep, and a large animal, e.g., a cow, that is in danger of imminent death. The slaughter of a small animal that when being slaughtered extended its foreleg that was bent and did not restore it to the bent position is not valid, as extending the foreleg is only part of the natural course of removal of the animal’s soul from its body and not a convulsion indicating life. In what case is this statement said? It is in a case where the presumptive status of the animal was that it was in danger of imminent death. But if its presumptive status was that it was healthy, then even if there were none of these indicators, the slaughter is valid.
2:7	In the case of a Jew who slaughters the animal of a gentile for a gentile, his slaughter is valid, and Rabbi Eliezer deems it not valid. Rabbi Eliezer says: Even if the Jew slaughtered the animal with the intent to feed the gentile from its diaphragm [meḥatzar kaved], its slaughter is not valid, as the unspecified intent of a gentile is to slaughter the animal for idol worship, and it is prohibited to derive benefit from it. Rabbi Yosei says: The matter of the intent of the gentile is irrelevant in this case, as can be derived by means of an a fortiori inference. If in a place where intent while slaughtering the animal invalidates the slaughter, i.e., in sacrificial animals, such as when slaughtering an offering with the intent to sacrifice it beyond its designated time, everything follows only the intent of the priest performing the service and not the intent of the owner, then in a place where intent does not invalidate the slaughter, i.e., in non-sacred animals, is it not right that everything should follow only the intent of the one who slaughters the animal?
2:8	In the case of one who slaughters an animal for the sake of, i.e., to worship, mountains, for the sake of hills, for the sake of seas, for the sake of rivers, or for the sake of wildernesses, his slaughter is not valid. If there were two people grasping a knife together and slaughtering an animal, one slaughtering for the sake of one of all those enumerated in the first clause of the mishna and one slaughtering for the sake of a legitimate matter, their slaughter is not valid.
2:9	One may not slaughter an animal and have its blood flow, neither into seas, nor into rivers, nor into vessels, as in all those cases it appears that he is slaughtering the animal in the manner of idolaters. But one may slaughter an animal and have its blood flow into a round excavation containing water. And on a ship, one may slaughter an animal onto vessels as it is clear that his objective is to avoid sullying the ship. One may not slaughter an animal and have its blood flow into a small hole in the ground at all, but one may fashion a small hole inside his house so that the blood will enter into it. And in the marketplace one may not do so, so that he will not appear to emulate [yeḥakkeh] the heretics.
2:10	In the case of one who slaughters an animal and asserts that he is slaughtering it for the sake of a burnt offering, for the sake of a peace offering, for the sake of a provisional guilt offering, for the sake of a Paschal offering, or for the sake of a thanks offering, his slaughter is not valid, as it appears that he is consecrating animals and slaughtering sacrificial animals outside the Temple. And Rabbi Shimon deems his slaughter valid. If there were two people grasping a knife together and slaughtering an animal, one slaughtering for the sake of one of all those enumerated in the first clause of the mishna and one slaughtering for the sake of a legitimate matter, their slaughter is not valid. With regard to one who slaughters an animal for the sake of a sin offering, for the sake of a guilt offering for a definite transgression, for the sake of the offering of a firstborn, for the sake of the offering of animal tithe, or for the sake of a substitute for a sacrificial animal, his slaughter is valid. All of these offerings may be brought only as obligations and not as gifts. Therefore, there is no concern that he consecrated the animals. This is the principle: For any item, i.e., offering, which is consecrated as a voluntary vow or gift, in the case of one who slaughters for its sake the animal is forbidden. And for any offering that is not consecrated as a voluntary vow or gift but is an obligation that is incumbent upon him, in the case of one who slaughters for its sake the animal is permitted.
3:1	These wounds constitute tereifot in an animal, rendering them prohibited for consumption: A perforated gullet, where the perforation goes through the wall of the gullet, or a cut windpipe. If the membrane of the brain was perforated, or if the heart was perforated to its chamber; if the spinal column was broken and its cord was cut; if the liver was removed and nothing remained of it, any of these render the animal a tereifa. Additionally, a lung that was perforated or that was missing a piece renders the animal a tereifa. Rabbi Shimon says: It is not a tereifa unless it is perforated through to the bronchi. If the abomasum was perforated, or the gallbladder was perforated, or the small intestines were perforated, it is a tereifa. It is also a tereifa in a case where the internal rumen was perforated or where the majority of the external rumen was torn. Rabbi Yehuda says: For a large animal, a tear of one handbreadth renders it a tereifa, while for a small animal, it is a tereifa only if the majority of it was torn. And it is a tereifa where the omasum [hemses] or the reticulum was perforated to the outside, i.e., to the abdominal cavity, but not if the perforation was between the two. Likewise, if an animal fell from the roof, or if the majority of its ribs were fractured, or if it was clawed by a wolf, it is a tereifa. Rabbi Yehuda says: If it was clawed by a wolf in the case of a small animal, i.e., a sheep or goat; or clawed by a lion in the case of a large animal, i.e., cattle; or if it was clawed by a hawk in the case of a small bird; or if it was clawed by a large bird of prey in the case of a large bird, then it is a tereifa. This is the principle: Any animal that was injured such that an animal in a similar condition could not live for an extended period is a tereifa, the consumption of which is forbidden by Torah law.
3:2	And these, despite their condition, are kosher in an animal: If its windpipe was perforated or cracked lengthwise. How much can the windpipe be missing and still be kosher? Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Until the perforation is the same size as the Italian issar. If the skull was fractured but the membrane of the brain was not perforated, it is kosher. If the heart was perforated and the perforation did not reach its chamber, or if the spinal column was broken but its cord was not cut, or if the liver was removed and an olive-bulk of it remained, it is kosher. Additionally, it is kosher if the omasum or the reticulum was perforated one into the other. If the spleen was removed, or the kidneys were removed, or if its lower jaw was removed, or if its womb was removed, or if its lung shriveled by the hand of Heaven, the animal is kosher. In the case of an animal whose hide was removed, Rabbi Meir deems it kosher, and the Rabbis deem it a tereifa and unfit for consumption.
3:3	And these are tereifot in a bird: One with a perforated gullet, or with a cut windpipe that was cut across its width; or if a weasel struck the bird on its head in a place that renders it a tereifa, as one must be concerned that the membrane of the brain was perforated; or if the gizzard was perforated; or if the small intestines were perforated. In a case where a bird fell into the fire and its innards were singed [neḥmeru], if they turned green they are unfit, and the bird is a tereifa, but if they are red the bird is kosher. If a person trampled the bird, or slammed it against a wall, or if an animal crushed it and it is twitching, it is a tereifa because its limbs were shattered. But if the bird lasted for a twenty-four-hour period, and then one slaughtered it, it is kosher.
3:4	And these are kosher among birds: If a bird’s windpipe was perforated or cracked lengthwise; or if a weasel struck the bird on its head in a place that does not render it a tereifa; or if the crop was perforated. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: It is kosher even if the crop was removed. If the bird’s intestines emerged from the abdominal wall but were not perforated, or if its wings were broken, or if its legs were broken, or if the feathers on its wings were plucked, the bird is kosher. Rabbi Yehuda says: If the down covering its body was removed, it is a tereifa and unfit for consumption.
3:5	With regard to an animal that is congested with excess blood, or that was smoked, i.e., that suffered from smoke inhalation, or that was chilled and subsequently became sick, or that ate oleander, which is poisonous, or that ate the excrement of chickens, or that drank foul water, although in all these cases the animal is in danger, it is kosher. By contrast, if the animal ate deadly poison, or if a snake bit the animal, with regard to the prohibition of tereifa, consumption of the animal would be permitted, but it is prohibited due to the threat to one’s life if he eats it.
3:6	The signs that indicate that a domesticated animal and an undomesticated animal are kosher were stated in the Torah, and the signs of a kosher bird were not explicitly stated. But the Sages stated certain signs in a bird: Any bird that claws its prey and eats it is non-kosher. Any bird that has an extra digit behind the leg slightly elevated above the other digits, and a crop, which is a sack alongside the gullet in which food is stored prior to digestion, and for which the yellowish membrane inside its gizzard can be peeled, is kosher. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Tzadok, says: Any bird that splits the digits of its feet when standing on a string, placing two digits on one side of the string and two on the other, is non-kosher.
3:7	And with regard to grasshoppers, whose signs were also not stated in the Torah, the Sages stated: Any grasshopper that has four legs, and four wings, and two additional jumping legs, and whose wings cover most of its body, is kosher. Rabbi Yosei says: And this applies only if the name of its species is grasshopper. And with regard to fish, the signs are explicitly stated in the Torah: Any fish that has a fin and a scale is kosher; Rabbi Yehuda says: Two scales and one fin. And these are scales: Those that are fixed to its body; and fins are those with which the fish swims.
4:1	When a pregnant kosher animal is slaughtered, the slaughter also renders the consumption of its fetus permitted. Even if an animal was encountering difficulty giving birth and meanwhile the fetus extended its foreleg outside the mother animal’s womb and then brought it back inside, and then the mother animal was slaughtered, the consumption of the fetus is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. But if the fetus extended its head outside the womb, even if it then brought it back inside, the halakhic status of that fetus is like that of a newborn, and the slaughter of the mother animal does not permit the consumption of the fetus. Rather, it requires its own slaughter. If, prior to slaughtering an animal, one severs pieces from a fetus that is in the womb and leaves those pieces in the womb, their consumption is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. By contrast, if one severs pieces of the spleen or of the kidneys of an animal and then slaughters it, then even if those pieces are left inside the animal their consumption is prohibited, because an organ severed from a living being is not permitted by the subsequent slaughter of the animal. This is the principle: An item that is part of an animal’s body that was severed prior to its slaughter is prohibited even after slaughter, and an item that is not part of its body, i.e., its fetus, is permitted by virtue of its slaughter.
4:2	Upon its birth, the firstborn male offspring of a domesticated animal is automatically consecrated with firstborn status, and it is prohibited to derive benefit from it. Furthermore, if it dies, it may not be discarded, but must be buried. If an animal that was giving birth to a firstborn male was encountering difficulty giving birth, and in order to alleviate the difficulty one wishes to terminate the birth, he may cut up the fetus limb by limb and cast it to the dogs. Since the fetus was not born, it is non-sacred and does not require burial. If a majority of the fetus had already emerged, it is considered to have been born and is therefore consecrated; consequently, if one cut it up it must be buried, and the mother animal is exempted from having firstborn status conferred on any future offspring.
4:3	With regard to an animal whose fetus died in its womb and the shepherd reached his hand into the womb and touched the fetus, both in the case of a non-kosher animal and in the case of a kosher animal the fetus does not have the status of an animal carcass that imparts ritual impurity, and the shepherd remains ritually pure. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: In the case of a non-kosher animal it is impure, and in the case of a kosher animal it is pure. With regard to a woman whose fetus died in her womb and the midwife extended her hand into the womb and touched the fetus, the midwife is thereby rendered impure with the seven-day impurity imparted by a corpse, and the woman remains ritually pure until the offspring emerges from the womb.
4:4	If an animal was encountering difficulty giving birth and as a result the fetus extended its foreleg outside the mother’s womb, and someone severed it and afterward slaughtered the mother animal, the flesh of the fetus is ritually pure. If one first slaughtered the mother animal and afterward severed the foreleg, the flesh of both the mother animal and the fetus are ritually impure due to having been in contact with a carcass. Since the foreleg was not permitted to be consumed through the act of slaughtering, it is regarded as a carcass with the associated ritual impurity. The rest of the flesh, which was permitted to be consumed by the slaughter, was in contact with it and so was rendered ritually impure from it; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: The flesh has the ritual impurity of having been in contact with a tereifa that was slaughtered, as the limb is regarded as a tereifa that was slaughtered. By Torah law, although it is prohibited to consume it, it does not impart ritual impurity. Nevertheless, the Sages decreed that a tereifa that was slaughtered, as well as anything that comes in contact with it, is regarded as ritually impure to the extent that it disqualifies sacrificial foods that come in contact with it. The Rabbis explain the rationale behind their opinion: Just as we found in the case of a tereifa that its slaughter renders it ritually pure according to Torah law, i.e., ritual slaughter prevents it from having the ritual impurity of a carcass despite not rendering the animal permitted for consumption, so too, the slaughter of the mother animal should render the limb of its fetus that left the womb ritually pure, despite the fact that its consumption is prohibited. Rabbi Meir said to them: No, if the slaughter of a tereifa renders the body of the animal ritually pure, it is because the slaughter is performed on something that is part of its body, i.e., its throat. Does it necessarily follow that you should also render the limb that left the womb pure, given that it is something that is not part of the mother’s body? Certainly not. The mishna asks: From where is it derived with regard to a tereifa that its slaughter renders it ritually pure, i.e., prevents it from having the ritual impurity of a carcass? The mishna notes there is a reason to say the slaughter should not render it pure, as one can compare a tereifa with a non-kosher animal: A non-kosher animal is prohibited for consumption; so too, a tereifa is prohibited for consumption. Therefore, conclude: Just as with regard to a non-kosher animal, its slaughter does not render it ritually pure, so too with regard to a tereifa, its slaughter should not render it ritually pure. The mishna questions the comparison: No, if you said that slaughtering cannot prevent an animal from having the ritual impurity of a carcass in the case of a non-kosher animal, which is distinct in that it did not have a period of potential fitness when slaughtering it could have rendered its consumption permitted, does it necessarily follow that you should also say this in the case of a tereifa, which did have a period of potential fitness? Perhaps, since the animal had a period of potential fitness its slaughter remains effective in preventing it from having the ritual impurity of a carcass. The mishna rejects this distinction: Take back to yourself this claim that you brought, as it is insufficient. What about a case where an animal was born as a tereifa from the womb, and so it never had a period of potential fitness? For such a case, from where is it derived that its slaughter renders it ritually pure? The mishna reformulates the distinction: No, if you say that slaughtering cannot prevent a prohibited animal from having the ritual impurity of a carcass with regard to a non-kosher animal, which is distinct in that there are no animals of its kind that are permitted through slaughtering, as the Torah states the concept of slaughtering only with regard to kosher animals, does it necessarily follow that you should also say this with regard to a tereifa kosher animal, given that there are other animals of its kind that are permitted through slaughtering, i.e., kosher animals that are not tereifa? Perhaps, since the concept of slaughtering is relevant to that kind of animal it can serve to prevent the animal from having the ritual impurity of a carcass even if the slaughter cannot render it permitted for consumption. The mishna notes: Based on this reasoning, one must conclude that with regard to an eight-month-old fetus that was born alive, slaughter does not render it ritually pure, as there are no animals of its kind that are permitted through slaughtering. The Torah applies the concept of slaughter only with regard to animals that were born full term.
4:5	In the case of one who slaughtered an animal and found within it an eight-month-old fetus, i.e., one that was not full term, whether it was alive or dead, or a nine-month-old fetus, i.e., one that was full term, that was dead, that fetus is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of its mother, as it is considered part of its mother. Therefore, its blood is considered part of its mother’s blood and is prohibited, so one must tear the fetus and remove its blood before it may be consumed. If he found within it a live nine-month-old fetus, it requires its own slaughter, as it is considered an independent full-fledged animal, and if one slaughters both the mother and fetus on the same day, one is liable for violating the prohibition against slaughtering an animal itself and its offspring on the same day; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Even when the fetus is nine months old, it is still considered part of its mother, and the slaughter of its mother renders it permitted for consumption. Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: Even if the fetus emerged alive and is now five years old and plowing in the field, the earlier slaughter of its mother rendered it permitted and it does not require slaughter before it is eaten. But if one tore an animal, i.e., he killed it without slaughtering it, and inside he found a live nine-month-old fetus, everyone agrees that the fetus requires its own slaughter because its mother was not slaughtered.
4:6	With regard to an animal whose hind legs were severed, if they were severed from the leg joint and below, the animal is kosher; from the leg joint and above, the animal is thereby rendered a tereifa and is not kosher. And likewise, an animal whose convergence of sinews in the thigh was removed is a tereifa and is not kosher. If the bone of a limb was broken but the limb was not completely severed, and the animal was then slaughtered, if the majority of the flesh surrounding the bone is intact, the slaughter of the animal renders it permitted; but if not, its slaughter does not render it permitted.
4:7	In the case of one who slaughters an animal and finds a placenta in its womb, one with a hearty soul [nefesh hayafa], i.e., who is not repulsed by it, may eat it, as its consumption was permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother. Nevertheless, since generally speaking, people do not consume such placentas, it is not regarded as food and so it cannot become impure with the ritual impurity of food even were it to come into contact with a source of impurity. And furthermore, it does not impart the ritual impurity of animal carcasses as it was permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother. But if one intended to eat it, one thereby elevated it to the status of food, and the placenta becomes impure with the ritual impurity of food if it comes into contact with a source of impurity. But even so, it still does not impart the ritual impurity of animal carcasses. With regard to a placenta, part of which emerged from the womb before the mother was slaughtered, its consumption is prohibited even after the mother animal is slaughtered because the emergence of the placenta is an indication of a fetus in a woman and an indication of a fetus in an animal. Accordingly, there is a concern that the head of the fetus might have emerged in that part of the placenta, thereby rendering the fetus as having been born, a status that precludes it from being permitted by the slaughter of its mother. Since the offspring is prohibited, its placenta is likewise prohibited. If an animal that was giving birth to its firstborn expelled a placenta, one may cast it to the dogs, and one does not need to be concerned that the placenta came from a male fetus that has the consecrated status of a firstborn. But in the case of sacrificial animals the placenta must be buried, because it came from a fetus that is assumed to have been sacred. The mishna adds: But one may neither bury it at an intersection, nor may one hang it on a tree, superstitious rites intended to prevent the animal from miscarrying again, due to the prohibition against following the ways of the Amorite, which prohibits Jews from practicing the superstitious rites observed by gentiles.
5:1	The prohibition against slaughtering an animal itself and its offspring applies both in Eretz Yisrael and outside of Eretz Yisrael, both in the presence, i.e., the time, of the Temple and not in the presence of the Temple, and it applies with regard to non-sacred animals and with regard to sacrificial animals. How so? In the case of one who slaughters an animal itself and its offspring, both of which are non-sacred, and slaughters them outside the Temple courtyard, both of the animals are fit for consumption, but for slaughtering the second animal, one incurs [sofeg] the forty lashes for violating the prohibition: “You shall not slaughter it and its offspring both in one day” (Leviticus 22:28). If both animals were sacrificial animals slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, then for slaughtering the first animal, one is liable to receive excision from the World-to-Come [karet]. For slaughtering the second animal one is not liable to receive karet. The second animal was not fit for sacrifice, since one may not slaughter an animal and its offspring on the same day. And both animals are disqualified for use as offerings, and for the slaughter of both of them, one incurs forty lashes apiece: The first being a sacrificial animal slaughtered outside the courtyard and the second being the offspring of an animal slaughtered that day. If both animals were non-sacred and slaughtered inside the Temple courtyard, both of them are unfit to be sacrificed, being non-sacred animals slaughtered in the courtyard. And for slaughter of the second animal, one incurs the forty lashes for slaughtering an animal and its offspring on a single day. If both animals were sacrificial animals slaughtered inside the Temple courtyard, the first is fit for sacrifice, and one who slaughters it is exempt from any punishment. But for slaughter of the second animal, one incurs the forty lashes for slaughtering an animal and its offspring on a single day, and it is unfit for sacrifice, because one was not allowed to slaughter it on that day.
5:2	If the first animal was non-sacred and the second a sacrificial animal, and both were slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, the first is fit for consumption and one who slaughters it is exempt from any punishment. But for slaughtering the second animal, one incurs the forty lashes for slaughtering an animal and its offspring on a single day, and the animal is unfit for sacrifice. If the first animal was a sacrificial animal and the second was non-sacred and both were slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, for the first animal, one is liable to receive karet for slaughtering a sacrificial animal outside the courtyard, and the animal is unfit for sacrifice. And the second is fit for consumption; and for the slaughter of both of them one incurs forty lashes apiece: The first being a sacrificial animal slaughtered outside the courtyard and the second being the offspring of an animal slaughtered that day. If the first animal was non-sacred and the second was a sacrificial animal and both were slaughtered inside the Temple courtyard, both of them are unfit for sacrifice. And for slaughtering the second animal, one incurs the forty lashes. If the first animal was a sacrificial animal and the second was non-sacred and both were slaughtered inside the Temple courtyard, the first is fit for sacrifice and one who slaughters it is exempt from any punishment. And for slaughtering the second animal, one incurs the forty lashes, and the animal is unfit for sacrifice, as it is non-sacred. If both animals were non-sacred, and one slaughters them, the first outside the Temple courtyard and the second inside the Temple courtyard, the first is fit for consumption and one who slaughters it is exempt from any punishment. And for slaughtering the second animal, one incurs the forty lashes for slaughtering an animal and its offspring on a single day, and the animal is unfit for sacrifice as it is non-sacred. If both animals were sacrificial animals, and one slaughters them, the first outside the Temple courtyard and the second inside the Temple courtyard, for slaughtering the first animal one is liable to receive karet, and for slaughtering both of them one incurs forty lashes apiece. One set of lashes is given because the first was a sacrificial animal slaughtered outside the courtyard, and the second set of lashes is given because the second animal is the offspring of an animal slaughtered that day. And both of them are unfit for sacrifice. If both animals were non-sacred, and one slaughters them, the first inside the Temple courtyard and the second outside the Temple courtyard, the first is unfit for sacrifice, as it is non-sacred, and the one who slaughters it is exempt. And for the second, one incurs the forty lashes and the animal is fit for consumption. If both animals were sacrificial animals, and one slaughters them, the first inside the Temple courtyard and the second outside the Temple courtyard, the first is fit for sacrifice and one who slaughters it is exempt. And for the second animal, one incurs the forty lashes, and the animal is unfit for sacrifice because its requisite time has not yet arrived.
5:3	With regard to one who slaughters an animal and its offspring and one of them is discovered to be an animal with a wound that would have caused it to die within twelve months [tereifa] and may not be eaten, or one who slaughters one of the animals for the sake of idol worship, from which deriving benefit is prohibited, or one who slaughters the red heifer of purification, or an ox that was to have been stoned, or a heifer whose neck was to have been broken, all of which are animals from which deriving benefit is prohibited, Rabbi Shimon deems one who slaughters them exempt from lashes for the slaughter of a mother and its offspring, as in his opinion, slaughter that does not render the animal fit for consumption is not considered slaughter and does not violate the prohibition. And the Rabbis deem him liable, as the slaughter need not render the animal fit for consumption in order to violate the prohibition. All agree that one who slaughters an animal and it becomes a carcass by his hand because the slaughter was invalid, or one who stabs an animal, or one who uproots the windpipe and the gullet, is exempt with regard to the prohibition against slaughtering a mother and its offspring, as it is written: “You shall not slaughter it and its offspring both in one day” (Leviticus 22:28), and in these cases, no ritual slaughter was performed. With regard to two people who purchased a cow and its offspring, where each purchased one of the animals, whoever purchased his animal first shall slaughter it first, and the second one must wait until the next day to slaughter his animal, so as not to violate the prohibition of: It and its offspring. But if the second one preceded him and slaughtered his animal first, he benefitted, and the one who purchased the animal first may not slaughter it until the next day. If one slaughtered a cow and thereafter slaughtered its two offspring on the same day, he incurs eighty lashes for two separate actions violating the prohibition against slaughtering the mother and the offspring on the same day. If one slaughtered its two offspring and thereafter slaughtered the mother cow, he incurs the forty lashes, as he performed a single prohibited act. If one slaughtered the mother and its daughter, and, later that day, slaughtered its daughter’s daughter, he incurs eighty lashes, as he has performed the act of slaughtering a mother and its offspring twice. But if one slaughtered the mother and its daughter’s daughter and thereafter slaughtered its daughter, he incurs the forty lashes, as he performed a single prohibited act. Sumakhos says in the name of Rabbi Meir: He incurs eighty lashes for slaughtering the daughter on the same day as its calf and its mother, as that act comprises two separate violations of the prohibition. On four occasions during the year one who sells an animal to another is required to inform him: I sold the mother of this animal today for the buyer to slaughter it,or: I sold the daughter of this animal today for the buyer to slaughter it. And those four occasions are: The eve of the last day of the festival of Sukkot, the eve of the first day of the festival of Passover, and the eve of Shavuot, and the eve of Rosh HaShana. And according to the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, the eve of Yom Kippur in the Galilee is included as well. Rabbi Yehuda said: When must he inform the buyer on those days? He must do so at a time when the seller has no interval between the sale of the mother and the offspring, as they were both sold on that day. But if the seller has an interval between the sales, he does not need to inform the buyer, as presumably each buyer purchased the animal to slaughter it on the day he purchased it. And Rabbi Yehuda concedes that in a case where one sells the mother animal to the groom and the offspring to the bride, that even if he did not sell them on the same day, he must inform the buyer, as it is obvious that they are both planning to slaughter their animal on one day, for their wedding feast.
5:4	On those four occasions, one compels the butcher to slaughter animals even against his will; even if there is a bull worth one thousand dinars and the buyer has only one dinar worth of meat, i.e., he already paid the butcher for one dinar’s worth of meat, one compels him to slaughter the animal and give him a dinar’s worth of meat. Therefore, if the bull dies before slaughter, although no act of acquisition was performed, it dies at the expense of the buyer, and he loses his dinar. But during the rest of the days of the year it is not so. On other days, until the buyer performs the act of pulling to assume ownership of the portion of the bull that he is purchasing, the bull remains in the butcher’s possession. Therefore, if the bull dies before the transaction is complete, it dies at the expense of the seller, who returns the buyer’s money.
5:5	With regard to the phrase “one day” that is stated with regard to the prohibition against slaughtering an animal itself and its offspring, the day follows the night. Therefore, one may slaughter an animal during the day and slaughter its offspring that night, but one may not slaughter an animal at night and slaughter its offspring the following day. Rabbi Shimon ben Zoma derived this by means of a verbal analogy. It is stated in the act of Creation: “One day” (Genesis 1:5), and it is stated with regard to the slaughter of an animal itself and its offspring: “One day” (Leviticus 22:28). Just as concerning the phrase “one day” that is stated in the act of Creation, the day follows the night, so too concerning the phrase “one day” that is stated with regard to the slaughter of an animal itself and its offspring, the day follows the night.
6:1	The mitzva of covering the blood after slaughter is in effect both in Eretz Yisrael and outside of Eretz Yisrael, both in the presence, i.e., the time, of the Temple and not in the presence of the Temple. And it is in effect with regard to non-sacred animals, but it is not in effect with regard to sacrificial ones. And it is in effect with regard to the slaughter of an undomesticated animal and a bird, with regard to animals and birds that are readily available in his home, and with regard to those that are not readily available and are hunted in the wild. And it is in effect with regard to a koy, because it is uncertain whether a koy is a domesticated animal and one is exempt from the covering of its blood or whether it is an undomesticated animal and one is obligated to cover it. And one may not slaughter a koy on a Festival, because covering its blood entails the performance of prohibited labor that is permitted only if there is a definite obligation to cover the blood. And if one slaughtered a koy on a Festival after the fact, one does not cover its blood until after the Festival.
6:2	In the case of one who slaughters an undomesticated animal or a bird and it is discovered to be an animal with a wound that would have caused it to die within twelve months [tereifa]; and in the case of one who slaughters an undomesticated animal or a bird for the sake of idol worship; and in the case of one who slaughters a non-sacred animal or bird inside the Temple courtyard or a sacrificial bird outside the Temple courtyard; or in the case of one who slaughters an undomesticated animal or a bird that was sentenced to be stoned, e.g., for killing a person; in all these cases, even though it is prohibited to eat any of these animals or birds, Rabbi Meir deems one obligated to cover their blood, and the Rabbis deem one exempt from doing so because, in their opinion, slaughter that is not fit to render the meat permitted for consumption is not considered an act of slaughter. One who slaughters an animal or bird and it became a carcass by his hand, i.e., the slaughter was performed incorrectly, and one who stabs the animal or bird, and one who tears loose the windpipe and the gullet, are exempt from covering the blood, as no act of slaughter took place, and one is obligated to cover blood only after a valid slaughter.
6:3	In the case of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor who slaughtered an undomesticated animal or a bird, and others saw them and ensured that the slaughter was properly performed, in which case the slaughter is valid (see 2a), one who oversaw the slaughter is obligated to cover the blood. If they slaughtered the animals among themselves without supervision, one is exempt from the obligation to cover the blood. And likewise with regard to the matter of slaughtering a mother and its offspring on the same day, if a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor slaughtered an undomesticated mother animal and others saw them, it is prohibited to slaughter its offspring after them. If they slaughtered the mother animal among themselves, Rabbi Meir deems it permitted to slaughter its offspring after them and the Rabbis deem it prohibited. And the Rabbis concede that if one slaughtered the offspring thereafter that he does not incur the forty lashes, as it is possible the mother was not properly slaughtered.
6:4	If one slaughtered one hundred undomesticated animals in one place, one covering of the blood suffices for all the animals and there is no obligation to cover the blood of each animal separately. Likewise, if one slaughtered one hundred birds in one place, one covering of the blood suffices for all the birds. If one slaughtered an undomesticated animal and a bird in one place, one covering for all of the blood is sufficient. Rabbi Yehuda says: If one slaughtered an undomesticated animal, he should cover its blood immediately and only thereafter he should slaughter the bird. If one slaughtered an undomesticated animal or bird and did not cover the blood, and another person saw the uncovered blood, the second person is obligated to cover the blood. If one covered the blood and it was then uncovered, he is exempt from covering it again. If the wind blew earth on the blood and covered it, and it was consequently uncovered, he is obligated to cover the blood.
6:5	In a case of the blood of an undomesticated animal or bird that was mixed with water, if there is in the mixture the appearance of blood one is obligated to cover it. If the blood was mixed with wine one views the wine as though it is water, and if a mixture with that amount of water would have the appearance of blood one is obligated to cover it. Likewise, if the blood of an undomesticated animal or a bird was mixed with the blood of a domesticated animal, which one does not have to cover, or with blood of the undomesticated animal that did not flow from the neck and does not require covering, one views the blood as though it is water. Rabbi Yehuda says: Blood does not nullify blood. Therefore, even if the undomesticated animal’s blood, which one must cover, is not recognizable in this mixture, he is obligated to cover the mixture nevertheless.
6:6	With regard to blood that spurts outside the pit over which the animal was slaughtered, or onto a wall, and blood that remained on the slaughtering knife, one is obligated to cover it. Rabbi Yehuda said: When is this the halakha? When no blood remains there from the slaughter except that blood. But if blood remains there from the slaughter that is not that blood, he is exempt from covering it.
6:7	With what substances may one cover the blood and with what substances may one not cover the blood? One may cover the blood with fine granulated manure, with fine sand, with lime, with crushed potsherd, and with a brick or the lid of an earthenware barrel that one crushed. But one may not cover the blood with thick manure, nor with thick, clumped sand, nor with a brick or the lid of an earthenware barrel that one did not crush. Neither may one merely turn a vessel over the blood. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel stated a principle: With regard to a substance in which plants grow, one may cover blood with it; and with regard to a substance in which plants do not grow, one may not cover blood with it.
7:1	The prohibition of eating the sciatic nerve applies both in Eretz Yisrael and outside of Eretz Yisrael, in the presence of, i.e., the time of, the Temple and not in the presence of the Temple, and with regard to non-sacred animals and with regard to sacrificial animals. And it applies to domesticated animals and to undomesticated animals, to the thigh of the right leg and to the thigh of the left leg. But it does not apply to a bird, due to the fact that the verse makes reference to the sciatic nerve as being “upon the spoon of the thigh” (Genesis 32:33), and a bird has no spoon of the thigh. And the prohibition applies to a late-term animal fetus [shalil] in the womb. Rabbi Yehuda says: It does not apply to a fetus; and similarly, its fat is permitted. And butchers are not deemed credible to say that the sciatic nerve was removed; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: They are deemed credible about the sciatic nerve and about the forbidden fat.
7:2	Although it is prohibited for Jews to eat the sciatic nerve, a Jewish person may send the thigh of an animal to a gentile with the sciatic nerve in it, without concern that the gentile will then sell the thigh to a Jew and the Jew will eat the sciatic nerve. This leniency is due to the fact that the place of the sciatic nerve is conspicuous in the thigh. One who removes the sciatic nerve must scrape away the flesh in the area surrounding the nerve to ensure that he will remove all of it. Rabbi Yehuda says: Scraping is not required; it is sufficient to excise it from the area above the rounded protrusion in order to thereby fulfill the mitzva of removal of the sciatic nerve.
7:3	One who eats an olive-bulk of the sciatic nerve incurs forty lashes. If one eats an entire sciatic nerve and it does not constitute an olive-bulk, he is nevertheless liable to receive lashes, because a complete sciatic nerve is a complete entity. If one ate an olive-bulk from this sciatic nerve in the right leg, and an olive-bulk from that sciatic nerve in the left leg, he incurs [sofeg] eighty lashes. Rabbi Yehuda says: He incurs only forty lashes, for eating the olive-bulk from the right leg, and he is exempt for eating the olive-bulk from the left leg.
7:4	In the case of a thigh that was cooked with the sciatic nerve in it, if there is enough of the sciatic nerve in it to impart its flavor to the thigh, the entire thigh is forbidden for consumption. How does one measure whether there is enough sciatic nerve to impart flavor to the meat of the entire thigh? One relates to it as though the sciatic nerve were meat imparting flavor to a turnip. If meat the volume of the sciatic nerve would impart flavor to a turnip the volume of the thigh when they were cooked together, then the entire thigh is forbidden.
7:5	With regard to a sciatic nerve that was cooked with other sinews, when one identifies the sciatic nerve and removes it, the other sinews are forbidden if the sciatic nerve was large enough to impart flavor. And if he does not identify it, all the sinews are forbidden because each one could be the sciatic nerve; but the broth is forbidden only if the sciatic nerve imparts flavor to the broth. And similarly, in the case of a piece of an animal carcass or a piece of non-kosher fish that was cooked with similar pieces of kosher meat or fish, when one identifies the forbidden piece and removes it, the rest of the meat or fish is forbidden only if the forbidden piece was large enough to impart flavor to the entire mixture. And if he does not identify and remove the forbidden piece, all the pieces are forbidden, due to the possibility that each piece one selects might be the forbidden piece; but the broth is forbidden only if the forbidden piece imparts flavor to the broth.
7:6	The prohibition of eating the sciatic nerve applies to a kosher animal and does not apply to a non-kosher animal. Rabbi Yehuda says: It applies even to a non-kosher animal. Rabbi Yehuda said in explanation: Wasn’t the sciatic nerve forbidden for the children of Jacob, as it is written: “Therefore the children of Israel eat not the sciatic nerve” (Genesis 32:33), yet the meat of a non-kosher animal was still permitted to them? Since the sciatic nerve of non-kosher animals became forbidden at that time, it remains forbidden now. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yehuda: The prohibition was stated in Sinai, but it was written in its place, in the battle of Jacob and the angel despite the fact that the prohibition did not take effect then.
8:1	It is prohibited to cook any meat of domesticated and undomesticated animals and birds in milk, except for the meat of fish and grasshoppers, whose halakhic status is not that of meat. And likewise, the Sages issued a decree that it is prohibited to place any meat together with milk products, e.g., cheese, on one table. The reason for this prohibition is that one might come to eat them after they absorb substances from each other. This prohibition applies to all types of meat, except for the meat of fish and grasshoppers. And one who takes a vow that meat is prohibited to him is permitted to eat the meat of fish and grasshoppers. The meat of birds may be placed with cheese on one table but may not be eaten together with it; this is the statement of Beit Shammai. And Beit Hillel say: It may neither be placed on one table nor be eaten with cheese. Rabbi Yosei said: This is one of the disputes involving leniencies of Beit Shammai and stringencies of Beit Hillel. The mishna elaborates: With regard to which table are these halakhot stated? It is with regard to a table upon which one eats. But on a table upon which one prepares the cooked food, one may place this meat alongside that cheese or vice versa, and need not be concerned that perhaps they will be mixed and one will come to eat them together.
8:2	A person may bind meat and cheese in one cloth, provided that they do not come into contact with each other. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Two unacquainted guests [akhsena’in] may eat together on one table, this one eating meat and that one eating cheese, and they need not be concerned lest they come to violate the prohibition of eating meat and milk by partaking of the food of the other.
8:3	In the case of a drop of milk that fell on a piece of meat, if the drop contains enough milk to impart flavor to that piece of meat, i.e., the meat is less than sixty times the size of the drop, the meat is forbidden. If one stirred the contents of the pot and the piece was submerged in the gravy before it absorbed the milk, if the drop contains enough milk to impart flavor to the contents of that entire pot, the contents of the entire pot are forbidden. One who wants to eat the udder of a slaughtered animal tears it and removes its milk, and only then is it permitted to cook it. If he did not tear the udder before cooking it, he does not violate the prohibition against cooking and eating meat and milk and does not receive lashes for it, as the halakhic status of the milk in the udder is not that of milk. One who wants to eat the heart of a slaughtered animal tears it and removes its blood, and only then may he cook and eat it. If he did not tear the heart before cooking and eating it, he does not violate the prohibition against consuming blood and is not liable to receive karet for it. One who places the meat of birds with cheese on the table upon which he eats does not thereby violate a Torah prohibition.
8:4	It is prohibited to cook the meat of a kosher animal in the milk of any kosher animal, not merely the milk of its mother, and deriving benefit from that mixture is prohibited. It is permitted to cook the meat of a kosher animal in the milk of a non-kosher animal, or the meat of a non-kosher animal in the milk of a kosher animal, and deriving benefit from that mixture is permitted. Rabbi Akiva says: Cooking the meat of an undomesticated animal or bird in milk is not prohibited by Torah law, as it is stated: “You shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk” (Exodus 23:19, 34:26; Deuteronomy 14:21) three times. The repetition of the word “kid” three times excludes an undomesticated animal, a bird, and a non-kosher animal. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says that it is stated: “You shall not eat of any animal carcass” (Deuteronomy 14:21), and in the same verse it is stated: “You shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk.” This indicates that meat of an animal that is subject to be prohibited due to the prohibition of eating an unslaughtered carcass is prohibited for one to cook in milk. Consequently, with regard to meat of birds, which is subject to be prohibited due to the prohibition of eating an unslaughtered carcass, one might have thought that it would be prohibited to cook it in milk. Therefore, the verse states: “In its mother’s milk,” excluding a bird, which has no mother’s milk.
8:5	The congealed milk in the stomach of the animal of a gentile and of an unslaughtered animal carcass is prohibited. With regard to one who curdled milk by using the skin of the stomach of a kosher animal as a coagulant to make cheese, which may then have the taste of meat cooked in milk, if the measure of the skin is enough to impart flavor to the milk, that cheese is prohibited. In the case of a kosher animal that suckled milk from a tereifa, the milk in its stomach is prohibited, as the milk is from the tereifa. If it was a tereifa that suckled milk from a kosher animal, the milk in its stomach is permitted, as the milk is from the kosher animal. In both cases, the milk that an animal suckles has the status of the animal from which it was suckled, and not that of the animal which suckled, because the milk is collected in its innards and is not an integral part of its body.
8:6	Although animal fats and blood are similar in that they are both prohibited by Torah law and punishable by karet, there are elements more stringent in the prohibition of fat than in that of blood, and likewise there are elements more stringent in the prohibition of blood than in that of fat. The elements more stringent in the prohibition of fat are the following: The first is that with regard to fat of an offering, one who derives benefit from it is liable for misuse of consecrated property. And second, one is liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition of piggul, if it was from an offering that was slaughtered with the intent to sprinkle its blood or partake of it beyond its designated time, and due to the prohibition of notar, if it was from an offering whose period for consumption has expired. And third, if one is ritually impure, he is liable due to the prohibition of partaking of it while impure. This is not so with regard to blood, as one is not liable in these cases for violating the prohibitions of piggul, notar, and partaking of offerings while impure, but rather is liable only for violating the prohibition of consuming blood. And the more stringent element in the prohibition of blood is that the prohibition of blood applies to domesticated animals, undomesticated animals, and birds, both kosher and non-kosher, but the prohibition of forbidden fat applies only to a kosher domesticated animal.
9:1	All foods that became ritually impure through contact with a source of impurity transmit impurity to other food and liquids only if the impure foods measure an egg-bulk. In that regard, the Sages ruled that even if a piece of meat itself is less than an egg-bulk, the attached hide, even if it is not fit for consumption, joins together with the meat to constitute an egg-bulk. And the same is true of the congealed gravy attached to the meat, although it is not eaten; and likewise the spices added to flavor the meat, although they are not eaten; and the meat residue attached to the hide after flaying; and the bones; and the tendons; and the lower section of the horns, which remains attached to the flesh when the rest of the horn is removed; and the upper section of the hooves, which remains attached to the flesh when the rest of the hoof is removed. All these items join together with the meat to constitute the requisite egg-bulk to impart the impurity of food. Although if any of them was an egg-bulk they would not impart impurity of food, when attached to the meat they complete the measure. But they do not join together to constitute the measure of an olive-bulk required to impart the impurity of animal carcasses. Similarly, there is another item that imparts impurity of food but not impurity of animal carcasses: In the case of one who slaughters a non-kosher animal for a gentile and the animal is still twitching and comes into contact with a source of impurity, the animal becomes impure with impurity of food and imparts impurity of food to other food, but does not impart impurity of animal carcasses until it dies, or until one severs its head. The mishna summarizes: The Torah included certain items to impart impurity of food beyond those which it included to impart impurity of animal carcasses. Rabbi Yehuda says: With regard to the meat residue attached to the hide after flaying that was collected, if there is an olive-bulk of it in one place it imparts impurity of an animal carcass, and one who contracts impurity from it and then eats consecrated foods or enters the Temple is liable to receive karet. By collecting it in one place, the person indicates that he considers it as meat.
9:2	These are the entities whose skin has the same halakhic status as their flesh: The skin of a dead person, which imparts impurity like his flesh; and the skin of a domesticated pig, which is soft and eaten by gentiles, and imparts the impurity of an animal carcass like its flesh. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even the skin of a wild boar has the same status. And the halakhic status of the skin of all of the following animals is also like that of their flesh: The skin of the hump of a young camel that did not yet toughen; and the skin of the head of a young calf; and the hide of the hooves; and the skin of the womb; and the skin of an animal fetus in the womb of a slaughtered animal; and the skin beneath the tail of a ewe; and the skin of the gecko [anaka], and the desert monitor [ko’aḥ], and the lizard [leta’a], and the skink [ḥomet], four of the eight creeping animals that impart ritual impurity after death. Rabbi Yehuda says: The halakhic status of the skin of the lizard is like that of the skin of the weasel and is not like that of its flesh. And with regard to all of these skins, in a case where one tanned them or spread them on the ground and trod upon them for the period of time required for tanning, they are no longer classified as flesh and are ritually pure, except for the skin of a person, which maintains the status of flesh. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri says: All eight creeping animals enumerated in the Torah have skins whose halakhic status is not that of flesh.
9:3	The halakhic status of the hide of an animal after it was flayed is no longer like its flesh in terms of becoming impure and imparting impurity. Nevertheless, in the case of one who flays either a domesticated animal or an undomesticated animal; a ritually pure animal that was slaughtered properly and afterward came in contact with impurity, e.g., the one flaying it is impure, or a ritually impure unslaughtered carcass; a small animal, e.g., sheep, or a large animal, e.g., cattle; and even after flaying the animal’s hide is still partially attached to the flesh, the hide’s halakhic status remains that of flesh in some circumstances. These circumstances are: If he is flaying the animal for the purpose of using the hide as a carpet, a tablecloth, or to drape over a couch, in which case he would cut the hide along the length of the animal from head to tail and then remove the hide from both sides, its halakhic status remains that of flesh until he has flayed the measure of grasping the hide, i.e., two handbreadths. And if he is flaying the animal for the purpose of crafting a leather jug, in which case he cuts a circle near the animal’s neck and removes the hide in a downward movement, its halakhic status remains that of flesh until he flays the animal’s entire breast. In the case of one who seeks to fashion a jug and begins flaying from the legs, until he removes the animal’s hide in its entirety, the entire hide is considered as having a connection with the flesh and its halakhic status remains that of flesh with regard to impurity, i.e., with regard to becoming impure and with regard to imparting impurity. If one removed the entire hide except for the hide over the neck, Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri says: It is not considered to have a connection to the flesh, and the Rabbis say: It is considered to have a connection to the flesh until he removes the animal’s hide in its entirety, including the neck.
9:4	In the case of a hide of an unslaughtered carcass upon which there is an olive-bulk of flesh, one who touches a strand of flesh emerging from the flesh or a hair that is on the side of the hide opposite the flesh is ritually impure. Although he did not touch an olive-bulk of the flesh, he is rendered impure with the impurity of an unslaughtered carcass. The reason is that the strand of flesh has the same status as the flesh itself, and the hair is considered protection to the flesh, which also has the same status as the flesh with regard to one who touches it. If upon the hide there were two half olive-bulks, the hide imparts the impurity of an unslaughtered carcass by means of carrying, because one moves them together, but not by means of contact with the flesh, because one touches them separately; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: The hide does not impart impurity, neither by means of contact nor by means of carrying. And Rabbi Akiva concedes in the case of two half olive-bulks where one skewered them with a wood chip and moved them that he is impure. And for what reason does Rabbi Akiva deem one ritually pure in a case where he moved both half olive-bulks with the hide, as in that case, too, he moved them together? It is because the hide separates between them and nullifies them.
9:5	With regard to the thigh bone of a human corpse, and the thigh bone of a sacrificial animal that was rendered unfit as piggul, i.e., an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to consume it after its designated time, or notar, i.e., part of an offering left over after the time allotted for its consumption, whether these thigh bones were sealed and there was no access to the marrow, or whether they were perforated and there was access to the marrow, one who touches them is ritually impure. The reason is that a piece of bone of a corpse the size of a barley grain imparts impurity, and the bone of a sacrificial animal that was disqualified in this manner imparts impurity by rabbinic decree via contact. With regard to the thigh bone of an unslaughtered carcass and the thigh bone of a creeping animal, one who touches them when they are sealed remains ritually pure. If one of these thigh bones was perforated at all, it imparts impurity via contact, as in that case contact with the bone is tantamount to contact with the marrow. From where is it derived that even with regard to impurity transmitted via carrying there is a distinction between sealed and perforated thigh bones? It is derived from a verse, as the verse states: “One who touches the carcass thereof shall be impure until the evening; and one who carries the carcass thereof shall be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 11:39–40), indicating: That which enters the category of impurity via contact, enters the category of impurity via carrying; that which does not enter the category of impurity via contact, does not enter the category of impurity via carrying.
9:6	The egg of a creeping animal in which tissue of an embryo developed and one who comes into contact with the egg are ritually pure, as the impure creeping animal is hermetically sealed. But if one perforated the egg with a hole of any size, one who comes in contact with the egg is ritually impure. In the case of a mouse that grows from the ground and is half-flesh half-earth, one who touches the half that is flesh is impure; one who touches the half that is earth is pure. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even one who touches the half that is earth where it is adjacent to the flesh is ritually impure.
9:7	The limb of an animal, with flesh, sinews, and bones, and the flesh of an animal, that were partially severed and remain hanging from the animal do not have the halakhic status of a limb severed from a living animal, which imparts impurity like an unslaughtered carcass, or of flesh severed from a living animal, which is ritually pure, respectively. If one had intent to eat the limb or the flesh, the limb or flesh becomes impure if it comes in contact with a source of impurity, and they impart impurity as food to other foods and liquids, although they remain in their place attached to the animal. But in order for them to become impure, they need to be rendered susceptible to impurity through contact with one of the seven liquids that facilitate susceptibility. If the animal was slaughtered, although this act of slaughter does not render it permitted for consumption by a Jew (see 73b), the limb and the flesh were thereby rendered susceptible to impurity by coming in contact with the blood of the slaughtered animal, as blood is one of the seven liquids; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Shimon says: They were not rendered susceptible to impurity through the animal’s own blood; they are rendered susceptible only once they have been wet with another liquid. If the animal died without slaughter, the hanging flesh needs to be rendered susceptible to impurity in order to become impure, as its halakhic status is that of flesh severed from a living animal, which is ritually pure and does not have the status of an unslaughtered carcass. The hanging limb imparts impurity as a limb severed from a living animal but does not impart impurity as the limb of an unslaughtered carcass; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And Rabbi Shimon deems the limb ritually pure.
9:8	The limb and the flesh of a person that were partially severed and remain hanging from a person are ritually pure, although there is no potential for healing. If the person died, the hanging flesh is ritually pure, as its halakhic status is that of flesh severed from a living person. The hanging limb imparts impurity as a limb severed from the living and does not impart impurity as a limb from a corpse; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And Rabbi Shimon deems the flesh and the limb ritually pure.
10:1	The mitzva to give the foreleg, the jaw, and the maw of slaughtered animals to the priests, known as the gifts of the priesthood, applies both in Eretz Yisrael and outside of Eretz Yisrael, in the presence of the Temple and not in the presence of the Temple, and it applies to non-sacred animals, but not to sacrificial animals. It is necessary to emphasize that it does not apply to sacrificial animals, as by right it should be inferred a fortiori: If non-sacred animals, which are not obligated to have the breast and thigh taken from them and given to the priest, are obligated to have gifts of the priesthood given from them, then with regard to sacrificial animals, which are obligated to have the breast and thigh given from them, is it not right that they should be obligated to have gifts of the priesthood given from them? Therefore, the verse states: “For the breast of waving and the thigh of giving I have taken of the children of Israel from the sacrifice of the peace offerings, and have given them to Aaron the priest and to his sons as a due forever from the children of Israel” (Leviticus 7:34), from which it is derived that the priest has only that which is stated with regard to that matter, i.e., the breast and the thigh, and not the foreleg, the jaw and the maw.
10:2	All sacrificial animals in which a permanent blemish preceded their consecration do not assume inherent sanctity, and only their value is consecrated. And once they were redeemed, they are obligated in the mitzva of a firstborn, i.e., their offspring are subject to being counted a firstborn, and in the gifts of the priesthood, and they can emerge from their sacred status and assume non-sacred status with regard to being shorn and with regard to being utilized for labor, as it is prohibited to shear animals with sacred status or utilize them for labor. And their offspring and their milk are permitted after their redemption. And one who slaughters these animals outside the Temple courtyard is exempt from karet, and those animals do not render an animal that was a substitute for them consecrated. And if these animals died before they were redeemed, they may be redeemed and fed to dogs. Although typically sacrificial animals that were redeemed may not be fed to the dogs, in this case it is permitted. This is the halakha with regard to all animals except for the firstborn animal and the animal tithe, whose sanctity is inherent, even when a permanent blemish preceded their consecration. With regard to all sacrificial animals whose consecration preceded their blemish, or who had a temporary blemish prior to their consecration and afterward developed a permanent blemish and they were redeemed, they are exempt from the mitzva of a firstborn, and from the gifts of the priestood, and they do not emerge from their sacred status and assume non-sacred status with regard to being shorn and with regard to being utilized for labor. And their offspring, which were conceived prior to redemption, and their milk, are prohibited after their redemption. And one who slaughters them outside the Temple courtyard is liable to receive karet, and those animals render an animal that was a substitute for them consecrated. And if these animals died before they were redeemed, they may not be redeemed and fed to dogs; rather, they must be buried.
10:3	With regard to a blemished firstborn animal, which one may slaughter and eat without being required to give the foreleg, jaw, and maw to the priest, that was intermingled with one hundred non-sacred animals, from which one is required to give those gifts, in a case when one hundred different people slaughter all of them, each slaughtering one animal, one exempts them all from giving the gifts, as each could claim that the animal that he slaughtered was the firstborn. If one person slaughtered them all, one exempts one of the animals for him. One who slaughters the animal of a priest for the priest or the animal of a gentile for the gentile is exempt from the obligation to give the gifts of the foreleg, the jaw, and the maw. And an Israelite who enters into partnership with a priest or a gentile must mark the animal to indicate that it is jointly owned and exempt from the obligation to give the gifts. And if a priest sold his animal to an Israelite and said: The animal is sold except for the gifts with it, the Israelite is exempt from the obligation to give the gifts, as they are not his. If the Israelite said to the one slaughtering the animal: Sell me the innards of a cow, and there were gifts included with it, i.e., the maw, the purchaser gives them to the priest and he does not deduct the value of the gifts from the money that he pays him. If he bought the innards from the slaughterer by weight, the purchaser gives the gifts, i.e., the maw, to the priest and deducts the value of the gifts from the money that he pays him.
10:4	In the case of a convert who converted and he had a cow, if the cow was slaughtered before he converted, he is exempt from giving the gifts to the priest. If the animal was slaughtered after he converted, the convert is obligated to give the gifts. If there is uncertainty whether it was slaughtered before or after the conversion, the convert is exempt, as the burden of proof rests upon the claimant. What is the definition of the foreleg that is given to the priests as one of the gifts? It is the part of the leg from the joint of the lower knee until the rounded protrusion surrounding the thigh bone of the foreleg; and that is the foreleg mentioned in the Torah with regard to the nazirite: “And the priest shall take the foreleg of the ram when it is cooked” (Numbers 6:19). And the parallel in the hind leg is the thigh that is given to the priest from the peace offering, which is also from the joint of the lower knee until the rounded protrusion surrounding the thigh bone. Rabbi Yehuda says: The thigh is from the joint of the lower knee until the upper knee joint, which connects the middle and upper parts of the leg. What is the definition of the jaw? It is from the joint of the lower jaw beneath the temples and downward until the upper ring of the windpipe.
11:1	The mitzva of the first sheared wool that every Jew must give to the priest, as stated in the verse: “And the first sheared wool of your flock [tzonekha] shall you give him” (Deuteronomy 18:4), applies both in Eretz Yisrael and outside of Eretz Yisrael, in the presence of the Temple and not in the presence of the Temple, and with regard to non-sacred animals. But it does not apply to sacrificial animals. There are more stringent elements in the mitzva of the foreleg, the jaw, and the maw (see 130a) than in the halakha of the first sheared wool in that the mitzva of the foreleg, the jaw, and the maw applies to cattle and to sheep, as it is written: “Whether it be ox or sheep, that he shall give unto the priest the foreleg, and the jaw, and the maw” (Deuteronomy 18:3); and it applies to numerous animals and to few animals. But by contrast, the mitzva of the first sheared wool applies only to sheep and not to goats and cattle, and applies only to numerous animals.
11:2	And how many are numerous? Beit Shammai say: It is at least two sheep, as it is stated: “That a man shall rear a young cow, and two sheep [tzon]” (Isaiah 7:21), indicating that two sheep are characterized as tzon; and the mitzva of the first sheared wool is written using the term “your flock [tzonekha].” And Beit Hillel say: It is at least five sheep, as it is stated: “And five sheep [tzon] made” (I Samuel 25:18). Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas says: When shearing five sheep, the sheared wool of each sheep weighing one hundred dinars each and half [peras] of one hundred dinars each, i.e., one hundred and fifty dinars each, are subject to the obligation of the first sheared wool, i.e., they render the owner obligated to give the first sheared wool to the priests. And the Rabbis say: Any five sheep, each of whose sheared wool weighs any amount, render the owner obligated in the mitzva. And how much of the sheared wool does one give to the priest? One gives him sheared wool of the weight of five sela in Judea, which are the equivalent of ten sela in the Galilee, as the weight of the Galilean sela is half that of the Judean sela. Furthermore, although one may give the wool to the priest without laundering it, this must be the weight of the wool once laundered and not when sullied, as is characteristic of wool when sheared. The measure that must be given to the priest is enough to fashion a small garment from it, as it is stated: “Shall you give him” (Deuteronomy 18:4), indicating that the sheared wool must contain enough for a proper gift. If the owner of the shearing did not manage to give it to the priest until he dyed it, the owner is exempt from the mitzva of the first sheared wool, as this constitutes a change in the wool by which means he acquires ownership of it. If he laundered it but did not dye it, he is obligated to give the first sheared wool, as laundering does not constitute a change in the wool. One who purchases the fleece of the sheep of a gentile is exempt from the obligation of giving the first sheared wool to the priest. With regard to one who purchases the fleece of the sheep of another Jew, if the seller kept some of the wool, then the seller is obligated to give the first sheared wool to the priest. If the seller did not keep any of the wool, the buyer is obligated to give it. If the seller had two types of sheep, gray and white, and he sold the buyer the gray fleece but not the white fleece, or if he sold the fleece of the male sheep but not of the female sheep, then this one, the seller, gives the first sheared wool for himself to the priest from the wool that he kept, and that one, the buyer, gives the first sheared wool for himself to the priest from the wool that he bought.
12:1	The mitzva of sending away the mother bird from the nest applies both in Eretz Yisrael and outside of Eretz Yisrael, and in the presence of the Temple and not in the presence of the Temple. It applies to non-sacred birds, but it does not apply to sacrificial birds. There are more stringent elements in the covering of the blood than in the sending away of the mother bird from the nest, as the covering of the blood applies to undomesticated animals and birds, to animals and birds that are readily available in one’s home, and to animals and birds that are not readily available and are hunted in the wild; and the sending of the mother bird from the nest applies only to birds, and applies only to birds that are not readily available. What are considered birds that are not readily available? They are any birds, even domesticated, that may fly away at any time, such as geese or chickens that nested in the orchard [pardes]. But if geese or chickens nested in the house, and likewise, with regard to domesticated pigeons [yonei hardisei’ot], one is exempt from sending away the mother bird.
12:2	With regard to the nest of a non-kosher bird, one is exempt from sending away the mother bird. In a case where a non-kosher bird is resting upon the eggs of a kosher bird, or a kosher bird is resting upon the eggs of a non-kosher bird, one is exempt from sending away the bird. With regard to a male pheasant [korei], which is known to sit upon the eggs like the female of its species, Rabbi Eliezer deems one obligated to send it away, and the Rabbis deem one exempt from sending it away.
12:3	If the mother bird was hovering over the eggs or fledglings in the nest, when its wings are touching the eggs or fledglings in the nest, one is obligated to send away the mother. When its wings are not touching the eggs or fledglings in the nest, one is exempt from sending away the mother. Even if there is only one fledgling or one egg, one is obligated to send away the mother, as it is stated: “If a bird’s nest happens before you” (Deuteronomy 22:6), indicating that one is obligated to send away the mother bird from the nest in any case. If there were fledglings capable of flying, or unfertilized eggs from which a fledgling will not hatch, one is exempt from sending away the mother bird from the nest, as it is stated in the same verse: “And the mother is resting upon the fledglings or upon the eggs.” From the juxtaposition of the fledglings and the eggs one derives: Just as the fledglings are living, so too, the eggs must be capable of producing living fledglings. This excludes unfertilized eggs, which cannot produce a living fledgling. And furthermore, just as the eggs need their mothers to hatch them, so too, the fledglings must be those that need their mothers. This excludes fledglings that are capable of flying. If one sent away the mother bird and it returned to rest on the eggs, even if it returned four or five times, one is obligated to send it away again, as it is stated: “You shall send [shalle’aḥ teshallaḥ] the mother” (Deuteronomy 22:7). The doubled verb indicates that one must send away the mother bird multiple times if needed. If one said: I am hereby taking the mother and sending away the offspring, he is still obligated to send away the mother even if he sent away the offspring, as it is stated: “You shall send the mother.” If one sent away the mother and took the offspring and then returned them to the mother’s nest, and thereafter the mother returned and rested upon them, one is exempt from sending away the mother bird.
12:4	With regard to one who takes the mother bird with its fledglings, Rabbi Yehuda says: He is flogged for taking the mother bird, and he does not send away the mother. And the Rabbis say: He sends away the mother and is not flogged, as this is the principle: With regard to any prohibition that entails a command to arise and perform a mitzva, one is not flogged for its violation.
12:5	A person may not take the mother bird with the offspring even if he takes the mother for use as part of the ritual to purify the leper. The mishna compares the reward for performing the mitzva of sending away the mother bird from the nest to the reward for performing other mitzvot: And if with regard to the sending away of the mother bird, which is a mitzva whose performance is simple, as it entails a loss of no more than an issar, i.e., the value of the mother bird, the Torah says: “That it may be well with you, and that you may prolong your days” (Deuteronomy 22:7), it may be derived by a fortiori inference that the reward is no less for the fulfillment of the mitzvot in the Torah whose performance is demanding.
-- Mishnah Chullin — (Sefaria merged English versions) (Public Domain or CC-BY (per Sefaria source data))