Statecraft, Globalization, and Ethics
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Source: Bahá'í Library Online (bahai-library.com), curated by Jonah Winters. Used by permission of the curator. Original citation: Charles O. Lerche, Statecraft, Globalization, and Ethics, bahai-library.com.
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Statecraft, Globalization, and Ethics*
Charles O. Lerche

Abstract
This article explores the impact of' cosmopolitctn mOrc/lity 011 international
statecrajt in an era of' globalization. The historical roots (if the main schools oj
thought on morality and international relations {Ire discussed, and three
alternative views developed. Globalization, as Cl process (if 'yl!orld economic,
political, and social change is introduced, and its implications for statecraft
outlined. In this regard, globalism is put forth as (l positive, and potentialiy
corrective, dimension of globalization, and the Bahci'[ teachings drawn upon as
a source of globalist ethical vision for the future.

Resume
eet article explore l'impact de la morale cosmopolite sur la diplom.atie
internationale dans une ere de globalisation. Il discule des racines historiques
des principales ecoles de pensee sur la morale et les relations internationales et
developpe trois points de vue alternatives. If introduit La globalisation en tant
que processus mondial de changement economique, poTitique, et social et decrit
ses implications pour la diplom.atie. Dans ceUe perspective, Ie globalismc est
presente com me une dimension positive et potentiellement corrective de la
globalisation et les enseignements Bah6'(s comme IInc source de vision iithique
globaliste pour l'avenir.

Resllmen
Este artIculo sonde a e1 ill1pacto de la I1wralidoc! cosmopolita sobre el arte de
gobemar en una era de globalizacion. Se disculen las rain's his/oricas de las
principales doctrinas referentes a la morulidad y las relacione.s
internacionales, y los Ires puntos de vista disyuntivos desarrollados. Se
presenta la globalizaciol1 como proceso de cambios sociales, polfiicos, )
economicos, y se peljilan sus insinuaciones para el urte de gobenwr. Ell cuantc
a 10 referido, se adelanto el globalislno como una dimensir5n positiva, )
potencialmente correctiva, de la globalizacion, voliendose de las ensefianza,bah6'{s comofuente de llna vision hiCCl globalista pam el/ilturo.

'J' Paper presentedlo lbe Baba'i Inlernalional Polilics and Law Interest Group (BlPOLlG) seminar
Association for Baba'i Studies-English Speaking Europe, London School of Economics, June ILl
and 15, 1997.
72         THE JOURNAL OF BAHA'I STUDIES                                   9.2.1999

We have also heard that thou has entrusted the reins of counsel into the
hands of the representatives of the people. Thou, indeed, hast done well,
for thereby the foundations of the edifice of thine affairs will be
strengthened, and the hearts of all that are beneath thy shadow, whether
high or low, will be tranquillized. It behoveth them, however, to be
trustworthy among His servants, and to regard themselves as the
representatives of all that dwell on earth. This is what counselleth them,
in this Tablet, He Who is the Ruler, the All-Wise .... (Emphasis added)
-Baha'u'llah, Tablet to Queen Victoria, Proclamation of BaM 'u' lldh

ebate over the ethics of statecraft has gone on for centuries, and the
D     contours of the "big questions" are well defined in the literature of political
philosophy and international relations. In both the theory and practice of
intemational politics, tension has always existed between the demands of the
nation-state as a provider of security and focus of loyalty and identity, and the
injunctions of cosmopolitan morality. Even the great revealed religions,
arguably the real sources of categorical morality, have over time become
identified with particular cultures and been used to rationalize the pursuit of
particularistic national ambitions.
The vexing question of finding criteria to detennine the responsibilities and
judge the actions of sovereign states is still very much with us, as exemplified
by the debates over who is responsible for what in the post-Cold-War
intemational system; and many of the same issues of power and justice raised in
classical philosophy centuries ago remain relevant today. Nonetheless, as we
approach the millennium, something is changing. More and more, one hears
talk of globalization and its implications for economic life, for the state, and for
identity. At the very least, the context in which the state's representatives make
their choices has been altered in significant ways, as constructive and
destructive social forces transcend borders and span (albeit unevenly) the entire
planet; and it seems likely that the choices themselves are being redefined by
the impact of these developments.
In what follows, certain aspects of the debate about ethics in international
politics are briefly summarized, and the implications of globalization for this
debate explored. A case is made that to fulfill its responsibility to increasingly
demanding citizens, statecraft requires not only a renewed moral integrity but
also a new conception of its mission and purpose in an interdependent and
shrinking world. In this regard, globalism is put forth as a positive, and
potentially corrective, dimension of globalization, and the BaM'i teachings
drawn upon as one important source of globalist ethical vision for the future.

Power and Justice
As any beginning student of international relations learns, the field was for
many decades characterized by a highly exaggerated division between "realists"
Statecraft, Globalization, and Elh ics

and "idealists." The realist outlook, arguing that nothing fundamental ever
changes in the struggle for dominance among states, traces its roots back to,
among others, Thomas Hobbes, who stated in Leviathan that the interaction of
Sovereigns was like a state of nature. He suggested further that:

To this war of every man against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing call
be ulljust. The notiolls of right and wrong, justice and injustice have there no place.
Where there is 110 C0111111011 power, there is no /e/lv: where no law, 110 injustice.
(Emphasis added) (Hobbes, Leviathan l88)

Though the state of nature is a myth, Hobbes's point was that sovereign equals
co-exist in a state of anarchy,1 and in an anarchy, morality has, at best, a
questionable status. Thus, the most common argument or the modern period bas
been that morality and ethics were only possible within coherent political
communities, i.e., sovereign states. In international relations, either no moral
principles applied, or the pursuit of the national interest itself took on the
character of a moral principle.
Another view, historically associated with the vvork of Immanuel Kant, is
called cosmopolitan, and argues that all people have moral obligations to all
other people in the macrosociety of human beings. It denies that there are any
relevant 1110ral distinctions between "us" and "them":

The cosmopolitan position asserts that international political and ecollomic
processes are not all that different ti-om, and may even be considered an extension of,
those conducted within the boundaries of a given slale. From this standpoint, slates
arc not self-contained, closed societies. Instead, lhey are increasingly ['jnding their
domestic affairs to be influenced and, in some aspects, directly controlled by
outside forces. Given this interdependence '; .. the world is not, and hardly will be
again, one in which a standard of global justice is ll11neCessary or undemanding'.
(McCleary, Seekillg Justice 16).

Fiona Robinson has described the ethical foundatiolls of cosmopolitanism in
this way:

From a cosmopolitan perspeclive, the moral agent exists as an individual and a human
being, prior to territorial or ancestral communilies, andUnenC1ll1lbered by social roles.
Morality from this perspective is neither relative nor contingent; it is not limited by
nationhood or statehood, time or place. Rather, it is timeless, universal and global.
Cosmopolilanism is the moral universalism of international relations: it accepts the
possibility of something which might be called a 'world community', anc! aspires to a

1. It can be argued that scholars of il1ternational relations have placed toO much emphasis on
Hobbes's discussion of international anarchy, since most of Leviatilol/ deals with how to create
order by empowering a sovereign to rule a group.
74            THE JOURNAL OF BAHA'I STUDIES                                           9.2.1999

global order in which individuals regmd themselves and all others as 'world citizens',
and where the boundaries of rights, obligations and justice me unrestricted across the
globe. (Robinson, "Rethinking Ethics" 4)

Furthermore, " . . . what is crucial to a cosmopolitan attitude is the refusal to
regard existing political structures as the source of ultimate value" (Brown,
International Relations Theory 24, qtd. in Robinson, "Rethinking Ethics" 4).
This attitude can be contrasted with a more statist ethic, quite close to some
variants of realism, which accepts existing divisions of humanity as real and of
moral significance. Robinson calls this tradition communitarian and explains
that:

According to the communitarian argument, the individual cannot and does not exist
prior to her social existence. As persons, and as moral agents, we have identities
which are created through our social situations .... While communitarians may
recognize the multiple nature of these identities, in political philosophy, and in
International Relations theory, communitarian philosophers have tended to privilege
the community of citizenship. Thus, in emphasizing particularism over the
universalism of cosmopolitanism, communitarianism regards the foundation for
morality as existing within the particular political community-specifically, the
nation-state-rather than in the 'global community of humankind'. (Robinson,
"Rethinking Ethics" 4)

In practice, of course, rulers have always recognized common norms that
ordered to some extent their interaction. Many of these-particularly those
defining sovereignty and its privileges-initially achieved the status of
customary international law and were subsequently codified. Others remained
less formal but were generally accepted as common practices or even
"institutions" of what Hedley Bu1l2 (and others) called an international society.
Bull, writing in 1977, argued further that all three of these views-which he
called the Hobbesian, the Kantian, and the Grotian (after Hugo Grotius)-were
in fact always present in international relations to some extent, but that one or
the other was dominant at any given time.
In a similar vein, Stanley Hoffman, in a series of lectures on "duties beyond
borders," debunked the "pessimistic inevitability" school of realism, which
views conflict as perpetual and inescapable, and then argued that political
leaders have a moral responsibility to promote and practice an orderly and
civilized style of statecraft:

Indeed, the ethics of the statesman ought to be guided by the imperative of moving
the international arena from the state of a jungle to that of a society, because the

2. Bull, The Anarchical Society. Bull refers specifically to the balance of power, international law ,
diplomacy, war, and the role of the Great Powers as institutions of international society.
Statecraft, Globalization, and Ethics                                        75

moral opportunities available to all of us~not only to the statesman~depend on the
state of the international system. Moral opportunities, in every milieu, depend on the
social framework. ... The closer the international system lS to a jnngle, the closer we
are to the floor of survival, the less opportunity for choice we have, the more values
we have to sacrifice, the more plausible the statesman's claim of necessity becomes,
the more we will be tempted to accept the 'morality of struggle' ~ancl either resign
ourselves to endless competition, or put a moral dressing on it, in either case
restricting our duties to our own community and, at most, to lts supporters and clients.
On the contrary, the more moderate the system is, the greater the range of moral
choice for all of us, the greater the possibility for the statesman to look at the world in
terms other than us vs. them~to try to move from what I call a Machiavellian
morality of public safety to a more universal morality that accepts the rightful claims
of others; so that the question: right or good for whom? is no longer answered:
exclusively for the statesman's community. (Hoffman, Duties Beyolld Borders
35-36)

These passages suggest three different points of departure for statecraft in an
anarchic state system. National decision-makers can act either to:

Promote the interests of their state, defined in narrow and aggrandizing terms~
even to the point of violent subjugation and exploitation of other peoples
(Hobbesian);
Promote the interests of their state, taking into account the need to maintain
good relations with other states, and to preserve, except under exceptlonal
conditions, oreler and peace (Grotian); or,
Promote the interesl of their state defined in light of and in harmony with a
broader conception of the "global interest" (Kantian).

This scheme indicates that while statecraft in pursuit of categorical values is
possible to some extent, it is difficult to imagine ethical statecraft ever
becoming an acquis of an anarchic state system. Rather, interstate politics can
always deteriorate in the direction of a "state of nature" because statesperSolls'
obligations to their constituents seem necessarily to take priority over
obligations to the rest of humanity. Furthermore, as Bull explains, in a world
organized politically into sovereign states, there really is no authoritative
spokesperson for the "global interest" (Bull, Anarchical 85-86). Despite the
numerous people, groups, and organizations who invoke this concept, there is
no legitimate political institution that embodies and promotes it. Even the
United Nations is fundamentally an ill.ternational organization, which, despite
much of its rhetoric, is at its best more Grotian than Kantian in both conception
and practice. Thus, there are structural, as well as ideological and philosophical,
underpinnings to a narrowly self-regarding statecraft. However, ,there are
indications that this very structure is undergoing significant change.
76            THE JOURNAL OF BAHA'I STUDIES                                  9.2.1999

Globalization 3
Definitions
There are a variety of definitions and descriptions of globalization, which,
though overlapping in many respects, do emphasize different dimensions of the
process. Roland Robertson, one of the first scholaTs to specialize in this area,
provides the following general definition of globalization from a
macrosociological viewpoint:

Globalization as a concept refers both to the compression of the world and
intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole ... both concrete global
interdependence and consciousness of the global whole in the twentieth century.
(Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture 8, qtd. in Waters, Globalisation 41)

Writing in a similar vein, Malcolm Waters highlights changes in the influence
of space on society:

We can therefore define globalization as: A social process in which the constraints of
geography on social and cultural arrangements recede and in which people become
increasingly aware that they are receding. (Globalisation 3)

Finally, Anthony Giddens's approach focuses on globalization as an interactive
or dialectical process:

Globalization can thus be defined as the intensification of worldwide social relations
which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events
occurring many miles away and vice versa. This is a dialectical process because such
local happenings may move in an obverse direction from the very distanciated
relations that shape them. Local transformation is as much a part of globalization as
the lateral extension of social connections across time and space. (Giddens,
Consequences of Modernity 64, qtd. in Waters, Globalisation 50)

Though the sociological studies are more comprehensive in scope, it is really in
regard to business and economics that the term "globalization" is most
frequently invoked. What is referred to here is "a qualitative shift toward a
global economic system that is no longer based on autonomous national
economies but on a consolidated global marketplace for production,
distribution, and consumption" (Holm and S0rensen, "What Has Changed?" 5)
and in which "distinct national economies are subsumed and rearticulated into
the system by essentially international processes and transactions" (Hirst and
Thompson, "The Problem of 'Globalization'," qtd. in Holm and S0rensen,
"What Has Changed?" 5). The primary vehicles for this process have been the

3. This section draws on the author's "The Conflicts of Globalization."
5ta tee raft, Gl obalizati on, and Et hies                                     77

increasing transnationalization of production, the resulting rise in influcnce of
multinational enterprises, and even more importantly, the explosion in the
volume and scope of transactions on international financial markets. In this
regard, consider the following commentary on contemporary change ill the
banking industry:

Banking is rapidly becoming indifferent to the constraints or time, place and
currency ... an English buyer can get a Japanese mortgage, an American can tap his
New York bank account through a cash machine in Hong Kong and a Japallesc
investor can buy shares in a London-based Scandinaviall bank whose stock is
denominated in sterling, dollars, Deutsche Marks, and Swiss ('rancs. (Final/cial Times
8/5/78, qld. in Walers, Globalisolion 89)

One of its most often noted effects is the homogenization of consumer markets
around the world, at least in certain areas-the so-called McDonaldization of
global consumption.
Though often touted as representing the height of economic rationality.
globalisation has also been portrayed as having it very dark side. Critics
repeatedly point out that the contemporary form of globalization,4 driven by
economic power, clearly promotes the hegemony of Western culture and
corporations; puts jobs and communities at risk in the rich countries and exploits
cheap labor in the poorer countries; increases threats to the environment; and
undermines the foundations of democracy and social stability by subjecting
national political institutions to forces of economic change beyond their control.
Furthermore, as a recent volume of essays (Holm and S0rensen, Whose World
Order) has highlighted, globalization is unel'en both in its processes and in its
effects. It produces concentrations and deprivations which, in t.he aggregate,
constitute an increasingly well-defined global power structure.

Consequences for the State
Though the implications of these trends extend far beyond the scope of this
article, certain ramifications of globalization for the state and statecraft can be
highlighted. First, though the system of individually sovereign states is still the
prevalent pattern in world order and nationalism the dominant form of political
consciousness, the fact remains that the borders of the state do not define the
limits of either political or economic life today. Rather, states themselves have
become just one set of actors in a world system that transcends them; and
governments find themselves increasingly obliged to follow policies largely
dictated by global trends, rather than formulated independently in response to
domestic priorities. This is what is intended when scholars of international

4. Several writers have argued that globalization has been underway for a long time. Robertson,
for instance, charts its evolution from the fifteenth century. See Robertson, Globalizatioll.
78            THE JOURNAL OF BAHA'i STUDIES                                   9.2.1999

relations characterize the international system as "system-dominant," or
analysts of political economy speak of the "internationalizing" of the state.
Second, globalization undermines citizens' habit of obedience to public
institutions, as people become more reflexive through exposure to the higher
volume of information generated by economic and technological globalization.
Waters argues, for instance, that modern society is

specifically reflexive in character. Social activity is constantly informed by flows of
information and analysis which snbject it to continuous revision and thereby
constitute and reproduce it. ... The particular difficulty faced by moderns is that this
knowledge itself is constantly changing so that living in a modem society appears to
be uncontrolled, like being aboard a careening juggernaut. ... (Emphasis added) 5

Anthony Giddens argued that the industrial nation-state was the embodiment of
"modern" society, and that it has been characterized by what he called "expert
systems"-repositories of technical knowledge that can be deployed across a
wide range of social contexts. These expert systems have, for instance, given
lise to a technocratic style of civil administration. However, this dimension of
modernity rests on the trust which, in the face of multiple risks and uncertainty,
individual people-citizens, consumers, clients, passengers, or patients,
depending on the context-place in these rather abstract and socially distant
expert systems. Growing reflexivity is, however, undermining trust in expert
systems around the globe. In regard to more and more issues there is a feeling
that experts have either failed, or do not have the public interest at heart.
Spybey, for instance, describes how in "late modern society" there is a
"growing refusal of people to accept expert assurances about its dangers"
(Spybey, Globalization and World Society 153). He goes on to state:

If, in the nineteenth century, those people who understood it and had access to its
benefits rejoiced in the bounty of modernity and its scientific-technological wonders,
the people of late modernity are cultured to expect mass consumption but are
increasingly sufficiently well informed to develop doubts about its benefits. This is
self-reflexivity and it is stimulated by negative experiences shared on a global scale,
like for instance the Chernobyl disaster. It is individualism, enabled by mass
education and encouraged by post-1960s permissiveness and self-awareness.
(Spybey, Globalization and World Society 153)

In a similar vein, James Rosenau has written at length about what he calls the
"global authority crisis," and his analysis provides insight into the nature and
scope of political conflict in a world of globalized "postinternational politics."
He explains that, as a result of greatly increased access to information and a
general impression of the diminished competence or declining effectiveness of

5. Waters, Globalisation 51. The juggernaut image is from Giddens.
State craft, Globalization, and Et hie s                                          79

public institutions, citizens have lost their habit of obeying. If leaders are not
able to find more effective means to gather support, people "begin to consider
redirecting their loyalties and legitimacy sentiments" (Rosenau, Turbulence
389). He goes on to illustrate how crises of this kind interact and "cascade"
around the planet:

The world is now so interdependent that "crisis networks" evolve, as information
about a crisis in one collectivity Hows to others, and as its consequences ramify. By
virtue of the information flows and of the interaction engendered by refugees, traders,
terrorists, and other boundary-spanning individuals and groups, authority crises
overlap and cascade across collectivities, forming linkages among them on an issue or
regional basis. (Rosenau, Turbulence 390)

Giddens and Rosenau describe a world in which people are more aware. more
empowered, and more critical through their access to information. However,
populations have become less compliant and more demanding at precisely the
time when national political institutions, as described below, are in most cases
reducing their budgets and programs.
A third effect is that in the post-Colcl- War world subnational and
transnational groups (whose identities and solidarities are based on race,
ethnicity, religion, or language) have become increasingly vocal and have used
the global media to make their discontent known. The Cold War was a conflict
among states and served to perpetuate the primacy of national identity in world
society; but in the 1990s the state, weakened by globalization, is less etJective
in either coercing compliance or integrating national society, and minorities are
able to reassert their identity more effectively in reaction to hegemonic cultural
forces. These minorities often see the state as no longer a promoter ancl
protector of clomestic interests, but rather a collaborator with outside forces
(Scholte, "Constructions"). Thus, in the 1990s it can be argued that the primary
locus of conflict may no longer be found between and among states, but
between the state and subnational groups.6
Lastly, economic globalization, and particularly the incredible volume and
mobility of global capital, have completely discredited the notion that a state
can have truly independent economic policies. Rather, "the markets" set
constraints on government action which politicians ignore at their own peril,
suggesting that financial markets have become in some respects institutions of
global governance whose "power" is greater than the state. Claude Ake, il
leading African critical thinker, has written in this connection that

[e]collo111ic forces are constituting the world into Olle economy ancl. to a lesser eXlenl,
one politicill society. Nations pmticipate in global governance according to lheir

6. T. R. Gurr has presented data to show that the vast majority 01' wars in the mid-1990s involved
ethnic conflicts. See Gurr, "Peoples against States" 347-77.
80            THE JOURNAL OF BAHA'I STUDIES                                  9.2.1999

economic power, which is coextensive with their rights. The global order is ruled by
an informal cabinet of the world's economically most powerful countries; its law is
the logic of the market, and status in this new order is a function of economic
performance. (Ake, "The New World Order" 26)

One major effect of these changes is that efforts to maintain an attractive
fiscal environment have obliged governments in industrialized nations to reduce
the unemployment and welfare benefits which, to some degree, protected
workers in the industrial countries from the creative destruction of capitalism
during the decades immediately after World War II. Globalization has, in fact,
radically shifted the balance of economic power in favor of capital (which is
highly mobile and thus able to move where profits are to be gained) and against
labor (which is much less mobile even in an economic community like the
European Union, and whose basis of organization is still more national than
international). As Ethan Kapstein has argued:

The forces acting on today's workers inhere in the structure of today's global economy,
with its open and increasingly fierce competition on the one hand and fiscally
conservative units-states-on the other. ... Growing income inequality, job
insecurity, and unemployment are seen as the flip side of globalization. ("Workers" 17)

This perception poses its own problems for governance:

It is hardly sensationalist to claim that in the absence of broad-based policies and
programs designed to help working people, the political debate in the United States
and many other countries will soon turn sour. Populists and demagogues of various
stripes will find "solutions" to contemporary economic problems in protectionism and
xenophobia. Indeed, in every industrialized nation, such figures are on the campaign
trail. (Kapstein, "Workers" 17)

These points highlight a fundamental problem of contemporary world order: a
process of globalization is fully underway, but institutions with sufficient scope,
power, and authority to regulate and direct this process toward beneficial ends
are not in place. The state, as an institution embedded in broadening and
accelerating global cultural and economic flows, finds its means of both action
and control greatly reduced and its credibility undermined. Even the much
debated question of "giving up sovereignty" to international institutions seems
more and more to be a "red herring," since much of what sovereignty connotes
in the popular imagination has already begun to erode.

Globalism
The previous section indicates a need for new thinking about old questions, and
in that sense, globalization issues are world order issues. As the existing
institutions of international politics and society have confronted these issues,
Statecraft, Globalization, and Ethics                                        81

basic questions of political philosophy having to do with power, authority, and
distributive justice-resolved, to some extent, for tbe nation-state i It the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries-are increasingly being raised again, but
this time in regard to the planet as a single political, social, and economic
system. Again, somewhat paradoxically, globalization lays a foundation for
such new thinking by creating a growing awareness of tbe planet as "one
place," a perspective which some have callee! glohalism. Mark Ritchie, for
instance, defines globalism as

the belief that we share one fragile planet whose survival requires mUlual respect anc!
careful treatment of all its people and its environment. Globalism is also a set of
values and ethical beliefs requiring active practice in OLlr day-to-day lives. Active
COillil1unications to foster understanding, the sharing of resources on the basis of
equity and sustainability, and mutual aid in times of need are three central aui vities
that undergird globalism. (Ritchie, "Globalization vs. Globalism" 1-2)

Globalist thinking grows out of a perception of the world as steadily
becoming more interdependent and integrated, a trend which the Bah,i'f
International Community (BrC) argues is reflected in

wide-ranging phenomena, from the fusion of world financial markets, which in turn
reflect humanity's reliance on diverse and interdependent sources of energy, fooel,
raw materials, technology and knowledge, to the construction of globe .. girdling
systems of communications and transportation. It is reflected in tbe scientific
understanding of the earth's interconnected biosphere, which has in lnrn given a new
urgency to the neeel for global coordination. It is manifest, albeit in a destructive way,
in the capacities of modern weapons systems, which have gradually increased in
power to the point where it is now possible for a handful of men (0 bring an end to
human civilization itself. It is the universal consciousness of this trend-in both its
constructive and destructive expressions-that lends such poignancy to the familiar
photograph of the earth as a swirling sphere of blue and white against tbe infinite
blackness of space, an image crystallizing the realizalioll that we are a single people,
rich in diversity, living in a common homeland. (Baha'i International Community,
Turning Point/or All Nations 1-2)

Globalism, through a vision of the Global Commons and a respect for human
diversity, can counter what critics see as globalization's unbridled exploitation
of resources and "standardization or homogenization of almost everything and
everybody" (Ritchie, "Globalization" 2). Ritchie argues further that:

In the case of inter-tribal, ethnic and religions wars a sense of globalism can reduce
the xenophobia and chauvinism that bring on these wars. Globalism is also needed in
order to encourage others far away from these conflicts to get involved and to share
their resources to help resolve them. ("Globalization" 2)
82            THE JOURNAL OF BAHA'i STUDIES                                      9.2.1999

Finally, in a very concise statement of the contemporary dilemma, Ritchie
argues that the longer a creative response to the negative trends of globalization
is delayed, the more difficult it becomes:

As globalization causes greater poverty and hunger, it fuels involuntary emigration,
which in turn may result in racism and fear of immigrants. In this way, globalization
destroys the feelings of globalism, love and concern with neighbors around the planet,
while creating the economic and ecological conditions that cry out for more, not less,
globalism.
My fear is that if we do not challenge globalization it will not only destroy the
ecology and the society but it will also engender so much resentment, greed, and
violence that we will no longer have the ability as a people to work together to tackle
global problems. ("Globalization" 2)

What then should be our priorities, defined from a globalist perspective?
Over the last several decades, there have been numerous efforts to define such a
"global agenda," and, particularly since the end of the Cold War, a consensus
has begun to emerge on a number of major questions, which are summmized in
the following list. 7

A Draft Global Agenda
• Strengthening Global Governance. Global issues require global solutions, and
global solutions can only be formulated through processes of global decision
making. This being said, only truly global issues should be decided at the world
level. Centralization and bureaucratization should be avoided; other tiers of
decision making and administration should be maintained and, in the case of
local administration, strengthened. Finally, democracy, in the sense of a true
empowerment of the masses and the institutions of civil society to participate in
decisions affecting them, needs to be strengthened at all levels of governance.
• Sustainable Development. Continuing to think of economic growth and
ecological balance as incompatible alternatives is dangerously shortsighted. The
principle of sustainability is already acknowledged (albeit grudgingly) by
governments and economic elites, but it needs to find a much wider application
in public and corporate policy at all levels. Governments and international
development agencies can provide positive incentives for firms to adopt "green"
technologies, and markets should be regulated to ensure that polluters pay for
the social costs of their actions.
• Collective Security. Though governments have hesitated to commit themselves
to this principle, it is now clear that a world without effective collective security

7. The discussion that follows draws primarily on 1be work of Ervin Laszlo, the Commission on
Global Governance, the World Order Models Project, the Baha'i International COIIlII1unity, and
vmious scholars in the field of Peace and Conflict Resolution Studies, such as John Burton and my
colleague Abdul-Aziz Said.
Statecraft, Globalization, and Ethics                                       83

is a world in which major political crises are either met with interventionS by
self-interested powers (individually or in coalition) or with indifference. In
either case, the result is resentment and suffering. Most economies could also
benefit greatly from a reduction in the costs of national defense. I-Ience, a
functioning collective security system would be both a more equitable and a
more cost-effective foundation for world order.
• Human Rights/Basic Needs. The idea that all human beings have inherent
rights of some kind is widespread-though views differ over which rights are
contained within this description. Furthermore, there are basic human needs
(physical, emotional, and spiritual) which cannot be erased through
socialization or denied indefinitely through coercion. No long··term social
stability or progress is possible in a world or a society characterized by large-
scale abuse of human rights or denial of basic needs .
• Fostering Planetary Citizenship. The average person is increasingly aware that
global forces influence her or his life, but this is frequently perceived as an
intrusive threat to economic security or cultural identity. Educational
institutions, nongovernmental organizations, and the media can all assist in
creating and strengthening a positive popular perception of world citizenship,
without which a constituency supportive Of creative global change will be
lacking.

However, while this list, or one like it, represents a positive value framework
for political action as we approach the millennium, it must be acknowledged
that leadership adequate to these tasks has not yet emerged. What seems to be
needed, as argued in the following passage from the Commission on Global
Governance, is a radically different kind of statecraft:

As the world faces the need for enlightened responses to tl1e challenges that al'ise on
the eve of the new century, we are concerned at the lack of leadership over a wide
spectrum of human affairs. At national, regional, and international levels, within
communities and in non-governmental bodies, the world needs credible and sustained
leadership.
It needs leadership that is proactive, not simply reactive, that is inspired, n01 simply
functional, that looks to the longer term and future generations for whol1l the present
is held in trust. It needs leaders made strong by vision, sustained by ethics, and
revealed by political courage that looks beyond the next election.
This cannot be leadership confined within domestic walls. It lllust reach beyond
country, race, religion, culture, language, life-style. It mllsl embrace a wider human
constituency, be infused with a sense of caring for others, a sense of responsibility to
l.he global neighborhood. (Our Global Neighbourhood 353)

8. Intervention lakes many forms, and I am not lilTliting it here to military force.
84            THE JOURNAL OF BAHA'I STUDIES                                       9.2.1999

It should be appreciated that the prescriptions of the Commission on Global
Governance mn counter to the priorities and style of political leadership that has
characterized most nation-states during the modern period. The Commission
argues, in effect, that a Kantian world politics is not just desirable, but essential
if current challenges are to be successfully met. What is also striking is the
extent to which the tasks and values mentioned here parallel those outlined
more than a hundred years ago by Baha'u'llah, the Prophet-Founder of the
BaM'i Faith, as promoting the best interests of the human race. This parallel
suggests, in fact, that the Baha'i teachings can serve as an important source of
inspiration and insight for the further development of globalist ethical thinking,
a premise that is explored in more depth in the next section.

"Let your vision be world-embracing . .. "
More than a century ago, BaM'u'llah declared that the human race had come of
age and was embarking on a new, divinely ordained stage in its collective
evolution that would witness the gradual emergence and fmition of a fully
integrated, tmly planetary civilization. He also stated unequivocally that the
"prevailing order" was "lamentably defective" (BaM'u'Hah, Tablets 171), that
it would "[s]oon ... be rolled up, and a new one spread out in its stead
(BaM'u'Hah, Gleanings 7). Thus, to Baha'is there is no "going back": the past
can no longer be a guide to the future, and, rather than being at the "end of
history," far-reaching vistas of challenge and opportunity stretch out before the
inhabitants of this planet. 9 This vision inspires the world BaM'i community
with optimism about the future and is combined with a profound conviction that
the current era, despite its crises and tragedies, is pregnant with creative
potential for positive change:

The turmoil now convulsing human affairs is unprecedented, and many of its
consequences enormously destructive. Dangers unimagined in all history gather
around a distracted humanity. The greatest error that the world's leadership could
make at this juncture, however, would be to allow the crisis to cast doubt on the
ultimate outcome of the process that is occurring. A world is passing away and a new
one is struggling to be born. The habits, attitudes, and institutions that have
accumulated over the centuries are being subjected to tests that are as necessary to
human development as they are inescapable. What is required of the peoples of the world
is a measure of faith and resolve to match the enormous energies with which the Creator
of all things has endowed this spiritual splingtime of the race. (Emphasis added)!O

9. In fact, it conld be argued that the Baha'i writings present a perspective in which humanity
should be seen as currently nearer to the "beginning" than to the "end" of its collective history.
10. Baha'i International Community, The Prosperity of Humankind, attachment to a letter of 23
January 1995 from the Universal House of Justice 'To the National Spiritual Assemblies of the
Baha'IS throughout the World," page 19. In this document the Baha'i International Community
Statecraft, Globalization, and Ethics                                       85

Furthermore, the Bahcl'} teachings reflect an unequivocally globalist
perspective. These two brief quotations from Baha'u'llah are indicative of this
theme:

The well-being of mankind, its peace and security, are unatlainable unless and until
its unity is firmly established. (Gleanings 286)

Of old it hath been revealed: 'Love of one's country is an element or tbe Faith of
God.' The Tongue of Grandeur hath, however, in thc day of His manifestatioll
proclaimed: 'It is not his to boast who loveth his country, but it is his who loveth the
world.' Through the power released by these exalted words He hath lent a fresh
impulse and set a new direction to the birds of men's hearts .. ". (Tavle/s 87-88)

Consider also the following distinctly cosmopolitan passage in which 'Abdu'l-
Baha critiques the origins and excesses of nationalism:

Why, then, all these fallacious national and racial distinctions? These boundary lines
and artificial barriers have been created by despots and conC]uemrs who sought to
attain dominion over mankind, thereby engendering palriotic feeling and rousing
selfish devotion to merely local standards of government. ...
God created one earth and one mankind to people it. Man llas no olher habitatioll,
but rnan himself has come forth and proclaimed imaginary bounclary lines and
territorial reslrictions, naming them Germany, France, Russia, etc. And lorrents of
precious blood are spilled ill defense of these imaginary divisions of our one human
habitation, uncler the delusion of a fancied and limited patriotism. (,Abelu'I-Baha,
Promulgation 354-55)

In numerous letters and messages during his mll11stly, Shoghi Effendi further
explicated the implications of the Baha'i principle of unity for contemporary
and future world affairs. For instance, he wrote in 1936 that:

Unification of the whole of mankinel is the hall-mal"k of the stage which human
society is now approaching. Unity of family, of tribe, of city-state, and nation have
been successively allempted and fully established. \Vorld unity is the goal towards
which a harassecl humanity is striving. Nation-building has come to all end. The
anarchy inherent in state sovereignty is moving towards ,1 climax. A world, growing
to maturity, must abanelon this fetish, recognize the oneness and wholeness or human
relationships, and establish once for all the machinery that can best incarnate this
fundamental principle of its life. (Shoghi Effendi, World Orcin 202)

However, the Baha'i Teachings also address the concerns of communitarians,
arguing that the integrity of both the universal and the particular can and must

(Bre) draws on relevant Baha'i principles to analyze major contemporary economic problems and
to propose solutions.
86            THE JOURNAL OF BAHA'i STUDIES                                   9.2.1999

be accommodated in the pattern of world order. Shoghi Effendi, for instance,
stated openly that a "sane and intelligent patriotism" had its place in world
society and that it was impossible and undesirable to "ignore" or "suppress, the
diversity of ethnical origins, of climate, of history, of language and tradition, of
thought and habit, that differentiate the peoples and nations of the world"
(Shoghi Effendi, World Order 41). However, he went on to explain that the
Baha'i Faith

insists upon the subordination of national impulses and interests to the imperative
claims of a unified world. It repudiates excessive centralization on one hand, and
disclaims all attempts at uniformity on the other. Its watchword is unity in
diversity .... (Shoghi Effendi, World Order 42)

The Baha'i International Community draws on this principle of unity to
derive a major globalist ethical principle, collective trusteeship, which, if fully
integrated into social and economic policy, would contribute significantly to
reducing the current extremes of wealth and poverty and the tension and
resentment to which they give rise:

Since the body of humankind is one and indivisible, each member of the race is
born into the world as a trust of the whole. This trusteeship constitutes the moral
foundation of most of the other rights-principally economic and social-which the
instruments of the United Nations are attempting similarly to define. (Baha'i
International Community, Prosperity 7)

Trusteeship involves a number of obligations of society toward its members,
among which are "employment, mental and physical health care, social security,
fair wages, rest and recreation" (Baha'i International Community, Prosperity 8).
This principle also has clear implications for the cultural and identity issues
discussed earlier:

The principle of collective trusteeship creates also the right of every person to
expect that those cultural conditions essential to his or her identity enjoy the
protection of national and international law. Much like the role played by the gene
pool in the biological life of humankind and its environment, the immense wealth of
cultural diversity achieved over thousands of years is vital to the social and economic
development of a human race experiencing its collective coming-of-age. It represents
a heritage that must be permitted to bear its fruit in a global civilization. On the one
hand, cultural expressions need to be protected from suffocation by the materialistic
influences currently holding sway. On the other, cultures must be enabled to interact
with one another in ever-changing patterns of civilization, free of manipulation for
partisan political ends. (Baha'i International Community, Prosperity 8)

Furthermore, if taken seriously as a basis for new policies, collective trusteeship
requires "a fundamental rethinking of economic issues" because
Statecraft, Globalization, and Ethics                                                  87

[t]he classical economic models of impersonal markets in which human beings act as
autonomous makers of self-regarding choices will not serve the needs of a world
motivated by ideals of unity and justice. Society will find itself increasingly
challenged to develop new economic models shaped by insights that arise from a
sympathetic understanding of shared experience, from viewing human beings in
relation to others, and from a recognition of the centrality to social well-being of the
role of the family and the community. (Baha'i International Community, Pl'Osperily
16)

These points in turn raise obvious questions about how such principles are to
be put into effect and what institutional changes would be necessary for their
realization. Such issues are addressed in a subsequent statement, Turning Point
for all Nations, prepared on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the
founding of the United Nations organization. As an introduction to their
proposals for reforming and strengthening the United Nations, the Baha'i
International Community describes the great steps forward in knowledge and
consciousness and the terrible upheavals and disasters of the twentieth century
as representing "twin processes-the collapse of old institutions on the one
hand and the blossoming of new ways of thinking on the other" which
constitute "evidence of a single trend which has been gaining momentum during
the last hundred years: the trend toward ever-increasing interdependence and
integration of humanity." 11
Our earlier discussion showed globalization to have both creative and
destructive aspects, and it would seem logical that new institutional
arrangements are necessary to address the problems without sti fling the positive
energies released. This is the approach adopted in Tumill.g Point for All
Nations. While promoting the eventual creation of a fully developed and
authoritative planetary government as the best long-term goal for world order, 12
it is suggested that for the immediate future:

... in accordance with the principles of decentralization ... international instilut.ions
should be given the authority to act only on issues of international concern wi1ere
states cannot act on their own or to inlervene for the preservation of the righls of

II. Baha'i International Community, TUl'I1ing Point for all Nalion.\' I. Predictions of the 8l'rival and
intensification of these tW1l1 processes occur frequently in the major writings of BahCt'u'lliih.
'Abdu'l-Baha, ami Shoghi Effendi.
12. In this regard they cite one of Shoghi Effendi's several statements on this theme:
Some form of a world super-state must needs be evolved. in whose favor all the nations of the world
will have willingly ceded every claim to make war, certain rights La impose taxation and all rights to
maintain armaments, except for purposes of maintaii1ing interrwl order within their respective
dominions. Such a state will have to include within its orbit all international executive adequate 10
enforce supreme and unchallengeable authority Oil every recalcitrant member of the commonwealth;
a world parliament whose members shall be elected by the people in tileil' respective countries and
whose election shall be confirmed by their respective governments; and a supreme tribunal who,e
judgment will have a binding effect even in such cases wilere the parties concerned did not
voluntm'ily agree to submit their case to its consideration. (Shoghi EJlelldi, World Order 40-41)
88            THE JOURNAL OF BAHA'i STUDIES                                         9.2.1999

peoples and member states. All other matters should be relegated to national and local
institutions. (BaM'i International Community, Turning Point 5)

Federalism is advocated as a useful model for global governance because it
"has proved effective in decentralizing authority and decision-making in large,
complex, and heterogeneous states, while maintaining a degree of overall unity
and stability."13
Finally on this note, it is argued that the masses of people who will be most
directly affected by the process must be actively involved in setting new goals
and formulating strategies of change. Acknowledging that "international bodies
have historically remained distant from the minds and hearts of the world's
people ... " and that "the vast majority of people have not yet developed an
affinity for institutions like the United Nations"; the Baha'i International
Community goes on to argue that:

Paradoxically, international institutions cannot develop into an effective and mature
level of government and fulfill their primary objective to advance human civilization,
if they do not recognize and nurture their relationship of mutual dependency with the
people of the world. Such recognition would set in motion a virtuous cycle of trust
and support that would accelerate the transition to a new world order. (Baha'i
International Community, Turning Point 13-14)

This admittedly brief overview highlights the degree to which in the Baha'i
teachings spiritual and social values fit coherently into a model of world order.
There is, for instance, no ambiguity about the fact that a world civilization
requires authoritative world institutions, or that the distribution of wealth should
not be solely determined by the unfettered operation of markets-issues in
regard to which other globalists have equivocated.

Conclusion
The previous discussion was primarily intended to explore some of the
limitations in prevalent conceptions of international politics and obligation that
are increasingly apparent in a rapidly globalizing era. Though most populations
and governments are still somewhere between Hobbesian and Grotian in
outlook, the Global Agenda demands commitment to Kantian values. This gap,
or contradiction, is real and threatening, as confirmed by the frequency with
which large-scale human tragedy is paraded before our eyes by an increasingly
panoptical global media. Thus, the present moment calls for a statecraft that
breaks with the past and takes unprecedented steps toward planetary integration.

13. Turning Point 6. They also suggest that the commonwealth is another interesting model of
governance "which at the global level would place the interest of the whole ahead of the interest of
any individual nation" (Turning Point 6).
Statecraft, Globalization, and Ethics                               89

In this context, Baha'u'llah's injunction. to parliamentarians to "regard
themselves as the representatives of all that dwell on earth," acquires great
significance, since only policies which take the. interests of all the inhabitants of
the planet into consideration can contribute to long-term stability in an
increasingly interdependent world. After all, if the world is indeed one system,
world order must ultimately be a "positive sum" game: in the long run, we all
either "win" or "lose" together.
To be effective, however, a commitment to globalism should be felt as well
as rationally argued-it must reach both the mind and the heart. Though many
groups in civil society are promoting such a value change,14 the Baha'i
community stands out among the world's religioLls communities for the
integration of its theological and ethical teachings with a globalist worldview,
and for that reason deserves serious attention from those seeking to find a
"ground" for moral decision in contemporary public affairs.

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90        THE JOURNAL OF BAHA'i STUDIES                          9.2.1999

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-- Statecraft, Globalization, and Ethics (Used by permission of the curator)